


JPRS 75221

28 February 1980

# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1500



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 75221	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle USSR REPORT: MILITARY AFFAIRS, No. 1500			5. Report Date 28 February 1980	
7. Author(s)			6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address  As above			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
			11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
13. Type of Report & Period Covered			14.	
15. Supplementary Notes				
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words)  This serial report contains information on Soviet military and civil defense establishments, leadership, doctrine, policy, planning, political affairs, organization, and equipment.				
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors  USSR Military Organizations Military Facilities Military Personnel Civil Defense				
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 15C				
18. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED		21. No. of Pages 84
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED		22. Price

28 February 1980

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## LENIN'S MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN 1917 REVIEWED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 3-9

[Article, published under the heading "On the 110th Anniversary of V. I. Lenin's Birth," by Candidate of Historical Sciences Col S. Gusarevich and I. Pakileva, assistant in the Department of CPSU History at the University of Moscow: "The Military Activities of V. I. Lenin on the Eve of and During Great October"]

[Text] A special place in V. I. Lenin's multifaceted military activities in the period of preparation for and conduct of the Great October Socialist Revolution was occupied by direction of the armed rebellion, based on a thorough Marxist comprehension of the laws governing societal development in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions, and on knowledge of and skillful utilization of objective and subjective factors. An ingenious strategist and tactician of the class struggle of the proletariat, he determined with maximum precision the moment for an armed uprising against the bourgeois Provisional Government, coordinated with precision the combat forces of the revolution, and skillfully guided the triumphal procession of the Great October Revolution throughout the country.

As M. V. Frunze wrote, "The greatest qualities of Comrade Lenin as leader of the proletarian revolution... leader not only in the area of pure politics but also politics transitioning to armed struggle, to rebellion, and subsequently to civil war,"<sup>1</sup> were brilliantly and graphically manifested in the proletarian movement.

The events of July 1917 signaled a turning point in development of the revolution and changed the political situation and correlation of class forces in this country. Operating underground pursuant to a Central Committee decision of 5 (18) July, V. I. Lenin, in the writings "Three Crises," "The Political Situation," "To Slogans," "Gratitude to Prince G. Ye. L'vov," "Reply" and others, made a detailed scientific analysis of the prevailing political situation and substantiated the necessity of changing Bolshevik tactics. He proved that the diarchy and the peaceful stage of development of the revolution in Russia had come to an end.

"...The counterrevolution organized, became strengthened and in fact took over government power,"<sup>3</sup> the leader of the proletariat wrote at that time.

Objectively the situation had developed as follows: "...Either victory of the military dictatorship to the end, or victory of the armed rebellion of the workers, possible only if it coincides with a deep, mass upsurge against the government and against the bourgeoisie on the soil of economic collapse and dragging out of the war."<sup>4</sup> V. I. Lenin pointed out that establishment of rule by the proletariat, supported by the poorest segments of the peasantry, was the objective of the rebellion.<sup>5</sup>

These Leninist theses and conclusions formed the basis of the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the RSDRP(b) [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (of Bolsheviks)], which was held on 26 July-3 August (3-16 August) 1917 semi-legally, in an environment of persecution of Bolsheviks by the Provisional Government and the Black Hundreds. V. I. Lenin was supposed to address the congress, presenting reports on major items: a political report by the party Central Committee, a report on the current state of affairs, and a report on revision of the party program. However, forced to hide in Razliv from Kerenskiy's sleuths, he was unable to attend the congress sessions. Nevertheless Vladimir Il'ich participated most actively in preparing for and holding the congress.

He sent to the congress his report on the political situation and kept in constant contact with the congress presidium, which regularly informed the party's leader on the proceedings at all sessions.

Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy, reminiscing, stated that it was only technically correct that the congress had taken place without Lenin. In actual fact he "directed the congress, took part in its proceedings, and the major documents were drafted with the knowledge and participation of Lenin."<sup>5a</sup>

The Sixth Congress of the RSDRP(b), guided by Leninist ideas, adopted a course of armed rebellion and temporarily withdrew the slogan "All power to the Soviets!" These and other decisions reached at the congress on the basis of Lenin's proposals constituted an example of an innovative, dialectical approach to assessment of events and elaboration of revolutionary strategy and tactics. The Sixth Congress demonstrated the party's solidarity behind its leader, V. I. Lenin, and expressed the readiness of the Bolsheviks to lead the revolutionary masses into a struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat.

Immediately following the congress, on V. I. Lenin's instructions, the party began vigorous efforts to arm the proletariat and establish Red Guard detachments. In October 1917 they totaled more than 20,000 in Petrograd, and approximately 200,000 men countrywide.

At the same time agitation-propagandist explanatory work was being conducted in the military forces of the Provisional Government, with the objective of winning them away from the bourgeoisie. The Military Organization of the RSDRP(b), or Voenka, as it was called then, established at the initiative of Vladimir Il'ich, was engaged in these activities.

In the fall of 1917 aggravation of the class struggle in Russia reached a culmination point. A strike movement by the proletariat engulfed the entire country. A total 469 collective worker demonstrations against the capitalists were recorded in September alone.<sup>6</sup> The peasant movement in the village assumed a mass character. In many localities it developed into peasant uprisings. The Soviets became revitalized in the course of the struggle against Kornilov, and the process of their Bolshevization became accelerated everywhere. All this attested to growth of the political army of the socialist revolution and its preparedness for decisive events.

Having analyzed the situation, between 12 (25) and 14 (27) September V. I. Lenin sent a number of letters to the Central Committee, the Petrograd and Moscow committees of the RSDRP(b) ("The Bolsheviks Should Seize Power," "Marxism and Rebellion," and others). In these letters he substantiated the necessity of immediate preparations for armed rebellion, and also elaborated a plan of execution.

The party's leader demanded first and foremost "organization of a headquarters staff of insurgent detachments, distribution of forces, movement of loyal regiments to the most important locations, encirclement of Aleksandrinka, seizure of Petropavlovka, arrest of the general staff and government, dispatch to the cadets and the wild division of detachments capable of standing to the death but preventing the enemy from advancing to the downtown areas; ...mobilize the armed workers, call them into a final, desperate battle, occupy the telegraph and telephone offices immediately, locate our uprising headquarters at the central telephone exchange, link it by telephone to all plants, all regiments, all points of armed struggle, etc."<sup>7</sup>

In September-October 1917 V. I. Lenin made adjustments to this plan and finally determined the direction of the main strategic thrust. He reached the following conclusion: "Around Petrograd and in Petrograd -- this is where this rebellion can and should be settled and executed, as seriously, as well-prepared, as swiftly, and as vigorously as possible."<sup>8</sup>

The uprising by the workers and soldiers of Petrograd and the entire "area," as V. I. Lenin noted, supported by Moscow, the Baltic Fleet and the Northern Front, was the decisive sector in the struggle for victory of the socialist revolution. The main task of the insurgents was to encircle and cut off Petrograd, to take the city with a combined assault by workers, naval and army troops.

The strategic concept of Lenin's plan was simple and clear to the utmost: to split the enemy and crush him piecemeal, giving him no time to gather his wits and respond. Victory at the decisive point of the revolution -- Petrograd and its immediate environs -- immediately opened up the possibility of victory of the revolution and the establishment of Soviet rule nationwide. Having determined the place of the uprising, V. I. Lenin also indicated with extreme precision the time of the armed uprising -- not later than 24 October 1917.

Thanks to Lenin's perspicacity, a substantial superiority in forces had been established by the time of the uprising in Petrograd. The ratio of armed forces of the revolution to those of the counterrevolution in and around the city was approximately 10:1. Lenin's statement on the necessity of possessing an overwhelming superiority of forces at the decisive moment at the decisive point found brilliant practical application during the period of armed uprising by the proletarian masses in Petrograd, which went down in history as a brilliant example of bloodless revolution.

Lenin's plan of uprising embodied a genuine unity of scientific Marxist theory and revolutionary practice. No revolution and no political party had ever achieved such a high degree of planning, purposefulness, consistency and organization as were achieved by the Bolsheviks under the guidance of V. I. Lenin, carrying out the armed uprising in October 1917.

In the course of preparations to overthrow the bourgeois Provisional Government, V. I. Lenin and the RSDRP(b) Central Committee were compelled to offer a resolute rebuff to anti-party efforts on the part of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinov'yev, who did not believe in the revolutionary capabilities of the Russian proletariat supported by the poorest segment of the peasantry, and made every effort to discredit Lenin's policy of armed rebellion. In order to defeat this policy, they advanced the opportunistic idea that they should be making preparations for a congress of Soviets, not for an uprising.

V. I. Lenin had in mind precisely Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinov'yev when he wrote that "in the Central Committee and among the top party leadership there is a current of opinion favoring waiting for a congress of Soviets, against immediate seizure of power, and against an immediate uprising. This current of opinion must be fought."

"Otherwise the Bolsheviks will have discredited themselves forever and will have become a zero as a party."

"To let such a moment pass and to 'wait' for a congress of Soviets constitutes complete idiocy or utter treason."<sup>9</sup>

On 1 (14) October 1917 V. I. Lenin wrote the "Letter to the Central Committee, Moscow Committee, Petrograd Committee, and Bolshevik Members of the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets," in which he declared, on the basis of an analysis of the current situation, that "to wait would be a crime against the revolution."<sup>10</sup> That same day he completed his article entitled "Will the Bolsheviks Retain Government Power?" in which he formulated the most important questions of the revolutionary struggle and argued that all the political and economic preconditions for a successful socialist revolution were present in Russia. In the epilogue to this article and subsequently in the article "Advice from an Outsider," the party's leader expounded the principal rules of the art of armed rebellion, the most important of which are the following: never play with rebellion -- once started, follow through to the end; gather a heavy superiority of forces at the decisive place and time; immediately shift to the attack --



defense is the death of an armed uprising; endeavor to take the enemy un-awares; at all times seek to achieve at least some success, maintaining moral superiority at all costs. Skillfully combining their main forces, those in rebellion, he emphasized, should seize and hold at all costs vitally important centers, communications centers, rail lines, major strategic installations, isolating the enemy and dislodging him from military strong points. Decisive execution of a plan of armed rebellion demands of the insurgents "skill and triple boldness."<sup>11</sup>

On 10 (23) and 16 (29) October historic sessions of the RSDRP(b) Central Committee were held under the direction of V. I. Lenin, who had illegally returned from Finland to Petrograd. The question of rebellion was discussed at the meetings. "These two sessions," recalled A. S. Bubnov, a member of the party Central Committee and participant in those events, "were decisive in the sense that they finally settled the question of an uprising."<sup>12</sup>

In his report at the first meeting, Vladimir Il'ich emphasized: "Politically the situation has become fully ripe for a shift of power.... We must talk about the technical aspect. The entire matter lies here."<sup>13</sup> Only two participants in the meeting -- Kamenev and Zinov'yev -- spoke in opposition to Lenin's assessment of the current moment and the urgent party tasks he advanced. The resolution proposed by V. I. Lenin was adopted by an overwhelming majority of votes (ten to two). The resolution stated, in particular: "Thus recognizing that an armed uprising is inevitable and that the time is ripe, the Central Committee instructs all party organizations to be guided by this and from this position to discuss and resolve all practical questions...."<sup>14</sup>

On 14 (27) October V. I. Lenin held a meeting with top officials of the Bolshevik Party and Military Organization under the RSDRP(b) Central Committee, which was attended by V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, M. S. Kedrov, N. I. Podvoyskiy, and others. Practical measures pertaining to preparing for an uprising were concretized at this meeting. They also discussed the question of a rebellion headquarters -- the Military Revolutionary Committee (MRC).

Such a body was established under the Petrograd Soviet. The adopted Statute on the MRC stated that it should deal with matters of defense of Petrograd, should thwart attempts by the Provisional Government to withdraw revolutionary troops from the capital, and prevent pogroms in the city. One of the tasks of the MRC was "to maintain revolutionary discipline among the worker masses and soldiers of Petrograd."<sup>15</sup>

In fact the Revolutionary Military Committee, the activities of which were directed by V. I. Lenin, became the agency for preparation and conduct of the uprising.

These same days, after 10 October, Vladimir Il'ich met repeatedly with officials of the Moscow Organization of the RSDRP(b) I. A. Pyatnitskiy,

V. N. Yakovleva, and other comrades who had come to the party Central Committee to discuss the question of the possibility of and timetable for a Moscow uprising. During discussions with them, considerable attention was focused on problems of additional mobilization of revolutionary forces, their political and military technical training.

At the second historic meeting of the Central Committee, held on 16 October, a Military Revolutionary Center (MRCe) was elected, consisting of Ya. M. Sverdlov, I. V. Stalin, F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, A. S. Bubnov, M. S. Uritskiy, for practical direction of the uprising.

Those present at the meeting adopted by an overwhelming vote Lenin's resolution demanding stepped-up preparations in all areas for an armed uprising. The resolution also stated that "The Central Committee and Soviet will indicate in a timely manner the favorable moment and expedient modes of attack."<sup>16</sup>

Kamenev and Zinov'yev voted against this document. Again failing to receive the support of Central Committee members, they proceeded with our right betrayal of the interests of the party and revolutionary masses. On 18 October the semi-Menshevik newspaper NOVAYA ZHIZN' published an article by Kamenev and Zinov'yev, which revealed to the enemies of the revolution the party's decision on conduct of an uprising.

V. I. Lenin called this action by Kamenev and Zinov'yev the most infamous treachery and blacklegger. He demanded that both capitulationists be drummed out of the party, since the element of surprise, essential for an uprising to be victorious, might be lost due to their actions. The bourgeois press immediately raised a hue and cry about an imminent "Bolshevik uprising."

"A difficult time. A difficult task. Serious treason," V. I. Lenin stated in a letter to members of the Bolshevik Party. "But nevertheless the task will be accomplished, the workers will become unified, and the peasant rebellion and extreme dissatisfaction of the soldiers at the front will have their effect! We shall close our ranks more solidly -- the proletariat shall be victorious!"<sup>17</sup>

The political situation in the capital was heating up hour by hour. On 23 October the Provisional Government approved a plan for crushing the imminent rebellion. It pursued the objective of paralyzing the insurgent forces by putting the Bolshevik press out of business, arresting the Bolshevik leaders, the members of the MRC and seizing Smol'nyy. On the following morning the military authorities of the Provisional Government attempted an assault on the offices of the Bolshevik newspapers RABOCHIY PUT' and SOLDAT, as well as raiding the printing plant of the newspaper TRUD. Decisive actions by the Petrograd MRC, however, which had dispatched subunits of Red Guardsmen and revolutionary soldiers to guard the newspaper offices and printing plants, thwarted the reactionaries' scheme.

The Central Committee specified a number of measures to strengthen the insurgent army and to increase its action readiness. They began monitoring execution of orders issued by the MRC as well as actions by the Provisional Government. The Central Committee established an alternate headquarters at the Fortress of Peter and Paul (Field Headquarters of the MRC) in case of attempts by the Provisional Government to seal off Smol'nyy. Ya. M. Sverdlov was assigned the task of maintaining continuous communications with the fortress.

Sequestered in a safehouse, V. I. Lenin kept a close watch on events and maintained continuous communications with the party Central Committee. Thoroughly analyzing events, he reached the ingenious conclusion that the critical moment in development of the revolution had come, and that its fate would be decided within hours. Precisely at this moment Lenin pointed to the only correct decision -- to initiate action by the combat forces of the proletariat for the purpose of overthrowing the Provisional Government. That evening he wrote a letter to the members of the Central Committee, with copies prepared on a duplicating machine. "I am writing these lines in the evening of the 24th; the situation is extremely critical," the letter stated. "It is as clear as crystal that right now delay in initiation of the uprising would be fatal.

"I strongly assure you, comrades, that everything now hangs by a hair, that the items which are now on the agenda are not to be settled by conferences, nor by congresses (even congresses of Soviets), but exclusively by peoples, by struggle by the armed masses."<sup>18</sup> V. I. Lenin argued with great force of conviction that the tactics of waiting for a congress, the tactics of Trotsky and his small group of confederates threatened destruction of the revolution: "We cannot wait! We could lose everything! ...It would be fatal... for a vacillating vote on 25 October...."<sup>19</sup>

It is without dispute that this letter from the party's leader is a document of enormous historical importance. At the same time it characterizes with great faithfulness V. I. Lenin himself, his political and military activities on the eve of and during the Great October Revolution.

Jacques Duclos, an eminent figure in the international Communist and worker movement, called this letter of V. I. Lenin the most important document in the history of the October Revolution. "I consider the episode of the letter," he wrote, "to be one of the greatest events in Lenin's life, since the success of the Great October Socialist Revolution depended in large measure on reaching that historic decision precisely at that moment when it was reached.

"And this fact per se is instructive for every revolutionary."<sup>20</sup>

This message from our party's leader to the members of the Central Committee put an end to vacillations on the question of when to act. It constituted a directive for immediately putting the revolutionary combat detachments into action, for them to seize strategic installations in the capital and to overthrow the Kerenskiy Government.

The uprising in Petrograd began on 24 October (6 November). Late in the evening of that same day V. I. Lenin arrived at Smol'nyy and took over direction of the insurgent forces. N. I. Podvoyskiy recalled: "With his (Lenin's -- ed.) arrival at Smol'nyy, the uprising assumed an especially vigorous pace."<sup>21</sup>

Messengers were sent to every corner of Petrograd carrying V. I. Lenin's orders and instructions. He spoke with the members of the MRC and met with Red Guardsmen, soldiers and sailors who were departing to perform combat missions. The October armed uprising was executed according to Lenin's plan. K. A. Mekhonoshin, an active participant in the events and an official of the Bolshevik Military Organization, recalled: "All reports came in to him, as to a central headquarters; he always was able to issue in a prompt manner the most valuable and precise instructions and would note in a timely manner a danger developing in a given area. Comrade Lenin was a true commander in chief of all the armed forces of the October Revolution, and the headquarters staff working under his command was unique in the annals of military history...."<sup>22</sup>

The success of the uprising was certain by the morning of 25 October. The majority of key installations in the capital (the telephone exchange, telegraph, radio station, bridges across the Neva, etc) had been seized by armed detachments of Red Guardsmen, soldiers and sailors. The Provisional Government, trapped in the Winter Palace, was without power and practically without troops. The Winter Palace was taken by storm at 2 a.m. The revolution was victorious.

At 10 a.m. on 25 October the Revolutionary Military Committee published an appeal entitled "To the Citizens of Russia!", signed by V. I. Lenin. It announced that the Provisional Government had been overthrown and that power had passed into the hands of the Soviets.

On the evening of that same day the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets convened at Smol'nyy. It adopted a proclamation entitled "To the Workers, Soldiers and Peasants!", proclaimed the transfer of all power into the hands of the Soviets, both central and local authority, and adopted decrees on peace and land. The Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets formed a Soviet Government -- a Council of People's Commissars, headed by V. I. Lenin.

All activities of the Military Organization of Bolsheviks and the Military Revolutionary Committee pertaining to preparing for the uprising were under the supervision of the party's Central Committee, headed by V. I. Lenin. The ingenious perspicacity of V. I. Lenin, his organizational talent, and firm leadership in preparing for and carrying out the October Armed Uprising guaranteed a decisive victory of the socialist revolution.

The victory of October is a victory of Leninism, under the influence of which generations of Communists have grown up, totally dedicated to the worker class, to the people and the cause of socialism. The life and

activities of Lenin as well as his outstanding qualities of revolutionary, proletarian strategist and tireless fighter for the Communist cause will always serve as an inspiring example for millions of revolutionary fighters throughout the world.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. M. V. Frunze, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Voenizdat, 1965, page 293.
2. Footnote omitted.
3. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 34, page 1.
4. Ibid., page 2.
5. Ibid., page 5.
- 5a. "Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], Vol 3, Book 1, Moscow, 1967, page 174.
6. See "Vooruzhennyye Sily Velikogo Oktyabrya" [Armed Forces of the Great October Revolution], Moscow, Nauka, 1977, page 176.
7. Lenin, op. cit., page 247.
8. Ibid., page 390.
9. Ibid., pp 280-281.
10. Ibid., page 341.
11. See Ibid., pp 334, 335, 383, 384.
12. "Po ukazaniyu Il'icha. Sbornik vospominaniy" [On the Instructions of Il'ich. Collected Reminiscences], Voenizdat, 1969, page 93.
13. Lenin, op. cit., pp 391, 392.
14. Ibid., page 393.
15. "Petrogradskiy Voenno-revolutsionnyy komitet. Dokumenty i materialy v trekh tomakh" [The Petrograd Military Revolutionary Committee. Documents and Materials in Three Volumes], Vol 1, Moscow, Nauka, 1966, page 40.
16. "Protokoly Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RSDRP(b). Avgust 1917-fevral' 1918" [Records of Proceedings of the RSDRP(b) Central Committee, August 1917-February 1918], Moscow, Politizdat, 1958, page 104.



17. Lenin, op. cit., page 422.
18. Ibid., page 435.
19. Ibid., pp 435-436.
20. KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 18 March 1970.
21. N. Podvoyskiy, "Lenin v 1917 godu" [Lenin in 1917], Moscow, 1957, page 59.
22. "Lenin -- vozhd' Oktyabrya. Vospominaniya petrogradskikh rabochikh" [Lenin, Leader of the October Revolution. Reminiscences of Petrograd Workers], Leningrad, Lenizdat, 1956, page 191.

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CSO: 8144 /0465

## PREPARATIONS FOR WORLD WAR II MANCHURIAN OPERATION DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 10-15

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Post-war Period," by HSU Army Gen I. Tret'yak: "Concerning the Operational Support for Troop Regrouping During the Preparatory Period for the Manchurian Operation"]

[Text] The Manchurian strategic offensive operation was a brilliant page in the history of the Soviet people and their glorious Armed Forces. Preparations were carried out and the operation was executed in a theater which differed sharply from the western theaters in its geography, length, depth, infrastructure, and physical scope.

Up to the spring of 1945 there were seven combined-arms armies in the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts, totaling 40 divisions. The composition and dispositioning of these troops were in conformity with the defensive missions. These forces were insufficient, however, for mounting large offensive operations. It was necessary substantially to reinforce these troops and to establish battle groups in the Trans-Baikal, Amur, and Maritime sectors.

In May-July 1945 the Soviet Supreme High Command redeployed from west to east the field directorates of the Second Ukrainian and former Karelian fronts. The 39th Army was transferred from the Koenigsberg area to the Trans-Baikal Front, the 53d and 6th Guards Tank armies were transferred to that front from Prague, and the 5th Army was moved from East Prussia to the First Far Eastern Front. In addition, large numbers of tank, artillery, air, engineer and other units and combined units were redeployed to the Far East. In quantity of redeployed men and equipment as well as spatial scope, this was the first intertheater strategic redeployment in the history of warfare, involving a travel distance ranging from 9,000 to 11,500 kilometers.

During the period of preparations for war with Japan, approximately 136,000 railroad cars carrying troops and supplies traveled from the west to the Far East and Trans-Baikal; operational movements comprised approximately 85,000 cars, and supply movements -- more than 50,000 cars.<sup>1</sup>

In June an average of 30 trains a day entered the rail line east of Baikal, with a figure of 22 trains per day in July. Simultaneously intra-front redeployment of troops was in progress, along the main waterways and rail lines of the Far East. This redeployment involved an additional 30 rifle, cavalry and tank divisions, including the cavalry of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army.<sup>2</sup>

All these activities were carried out for the most part in a concealed manner. Although the Japanese command was able to establish a gradual increase in Soviet troops along the border of Manchuria and that a massive redeployment of combined units and units from the west had begun, the Japanese were unable to pinpoint the time of initiation of our offensive, the axes or force of offensive thrusts of the fronts. Captured Japanese generals testified that initiation of military operations by the Soviet Army on 9 August took them completely by surprise.<sup>2a</sup>

An elaborated aggregate of redeployment support measures as well as rigorous, daily monitoring of execution of these methods made it possible to achieve the stated objective. We succeeded in maintaining secrecy as regards the scale and character of the strategic redeployment during the period of preparation for the Manchurian offensive operation and essentially succeeded in completing the redeployment on schedule.

Concealed execution of a large-scale troop redeployment was promoted by precision, comprehensive organization of operational support, which constituted a part of the entire aggregate of measures conducted in preparation for this operation. Operational support included the following: determination of an appropriate regimen of conduct by troops and staffs en route; determination of ways and means to camouflage and conceal transported combat equipment, preventing any possibility of information leaking on the objectives, missions and scope of the redeployment in progress; strict, systematic monitoring to ensure observance of concealment and camouflage measures by troops and staffs; organization of reliable antiaircraft defense and ground security for major rail yards and line structures (bridges, tunnels, etc) along the Trans-Siberian Main Line from Irkutsk to Vladivostok, for protection against enemy airstrikes and activities by enemy reconnaissance and raiding parties; secure sealing of the border, particularly in sectors adjacent to areas of off-loading and assembly of arriving troops; organization and conduct of concealed movement of troops from off-loading areas to concentration areas and assembly areas for the offensive.

General supervision over the redeployment was exercised by Headquarters, Supreme High Command (Hq SHC), and in addition, within the limits of their competence, under the supervision of the General Staff -- by the Commander in Chief and Staff of the Air Force, by officials of the Central Military Transportation Directorate, by directorates of the Armed Forces Rear Services and Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East, and by the command and staffs of the Trans-Baikal, First and Second Far Eastern fronts. All this ensured flexibility, coordination and efficiency in resolving problems in the course of transporting men and equipment.

In order to ensure secrecy and concealment of troop movements, the number of officials involved in planning, supervision and record keeping on centralized military transport movements was sharply restricted, and the number of prepared documents was reduced to a minimum. Transmission of information on movement of military trains was rigorously controlled, and telephone conversations and written correspondence on the troop redeployment were absolutely prohibited. Military train crews did not know the ultimate destination until arrival at the destination point. At each stop they would be informed only about the next station.

As a rule transported combat and other equipment would be camouflaged as civilian freight. Certain groups of military trains would be permitted to run on frontier sections of rail line only during hours of darkness, trains would pass rail junction stations without stopping, and train servicing operations would be performed at intermediate stations or on the line between stations.

Proper organization of advance and deployment of troops, which was sequentially effected according to the following scheme, was of great importance in achieving concealment of transport and the element of offensive surprise. Units and combined units would be moved up from permanent stationing locations or detraining points to assembly areas situated 70-150 km from the border, where combat and political training would be conducted; the daily routine of activities was maintained at the garrisons. Movement of the battle groups of fronts and armies into assembly areas for the offensive was conducted in a concealed manner, under the guise of field exercises, and as a rule during hours of darkness. The distance of assembly areas from the border was also determined in relation to terrain conditions. In the Trans-Baikal Front, on open desert-steppe terrain, the assembly area was located 30-40 km back from the border, while in the First and Second Far Eastern fronts, where forest-swamp and forested hilly terrain prevails, assembly areas were located 15-20 km from the border.

The troops of the First Far Eastern Front began moving up from the rear assembly areas on 13-15 July, that is, 25-26 days before initiation of hostilities. By 20-25 July the combined units and units had dispersed in the forward assembly areas and, maintaining an alert status, continued combat and political training; field exercises were conducted at the same time. The troops advancing toward the border occupied positions which had been fortified in advance with trenches, which ensured the concealed deployment of men and equipment. By 3 August the artillery combined units and units of the fronts had been moved up into predeployment areas, from which they could move up and occupy weapon positions overnight.

Advance to the assembly areas involved distances up to 300 km, by combined modes of transport or employing the units' own transport capabilities. The 5th Army (Col Gen N. I. Krylov, commanding), for example, advanced a distance of approximately 300 km from the Simakovka-Yevgen'yevka area to the Kamen'-Rybolov-Khorol' area by combined transport modes, and the 6th Guards Tank Army (Lt Gen Tank Trps A. G. Kravchenko, commanding) advanced

from the Bain-Tumen area to the Tamtsak-Bulakskiy bulge under its own power.<sup>4</sup> Units of mechanized troops and motor vehicle-drawn artillery of the Trans-Baikal Front detrained between Chita and Krymskaya, due to the limited traffic capacity of the rail lines, and proceeded from 600 to 1200 km under their own power.

It is evident from the above examples that although the railroads were the principal mode of transportation, motorization of the army, which had increased toward the end of the Great Patriotic War, made it possible to cover considerable distances by units under their own power, executing major intrafront redeployments. This helped greatly accelerate concentration of troops with a limited number of rail lines and helped gain time to ready them for combat operations.

The desert-steppe, wooded-mountain and forest-swampy terrain of the Far East created difficult march conditions. A lack of roads, and sometimes lack of distinctive landmarks as well complicated column travel. Water sources and fuel were few and far between en route. Aware of this fact, the command of the formations, combined units and units devoted particular attention to operational support of marches. Alongside establishment of transportable stores of water and firewood, reconnaissance parties engaged in scouting out routes and organizing traffic-control service made thorough preparations in day's halt areas by sending out engineer units in advance to scout out water supply and to drill wells. Considerable attention was devoted to training officers to lead columns and operate combat vehicles cross country by bearings, etc. In particular, in the 39th Army (Col Gen I. I. Lyudnikov, commanding) instructions on organization of signal-beacon service en route under conditions of desert-steppe terrain, drawn up prior to the operation, were executed with precision for the purpose of supporting the movement of troops, resulting in prompt movement of troops into the deployment areas.<sup>5</sup>

Engineer support of the redeployment boiled down chiefly to performance of tasks such as laying out cross-country routes, laying routes of passage across swamps, repairing and strengthening roads and bridges, as well as masking roads in sectors under enemy observation. In the 5th Army, for example, engineer work involved in moving the army into the assembly area and preparation for the offensive operation included laying more than 37 km of cross-country routes, more than 20 km of corduroy, fascine and brushwood road, repair of more than 70 km of road and 8 bridges, construction of 310 lineal meters of bridges and culverts, installation of more than 18 km of masking fence and 1,515 above-road camouflage drapes.<sup>6</sup>

Three air defense armies -- the Trans-Baikal, Amur, and Maritime -- were deployed to provide cover against air attack on lines of communication, detraining and troop assembly points, frontier rear areas and installations in the Far East. They were subordinate to the front command and consisted of air defense corps and divisions, independent antiaircraft regiments and battalions, as well as armored trains armed with medium and small caliber antiaircraft artillery. In addition, one fighter division each was added to the Trans-Baikal and Maritime Air Defense armies.



The bulk of the manpower and weapons of the air defense armies were deployed to protect rail lines and rail junction yards in areas within the range of hostile airstrikes. The air defense personnel and weapons of the combined-arms armies were deployed immediately as they were assembling in new areas. During the entire period of troop movement and concentration the fighters of the 9th, 10th and 12th air armies were in a state of readiness to repel Japanese air attacks. Installations to be defended against air attack included troop concentration areas, the most important rail yards and sidings, major railway bridges, cities and industrial centers, as well as areas of deployment of military supply depots.

Forward aircraft-warning service posts were deployed directly along the border. They had at their disposal a substantial number of radars.

Special surveillance was set up to spot the possible landing of enemy airborne assault forces in areas convenient for landing airplanes or gliders. The requisite manpower and weapons were designated for destroying such assault forces, primarily aircraft and mechanized troops.

During the period of concentration and deployment of Soviet troops in the Far East, the Japanese were maintaining large forces on the Soviet border and still possessed a fairly strong navy and large numbers of aircraft. In the Maritime sector alone the enemy deployed a 200,000-man force of the First Front of the Kwantung Army, which was capable of mounting a powerful attack on the Soviet Army troops which were readying for the offensive. Therefore additional measures were taken in advance to ensure reliable protection of the Soviet border in case of a surprise Japanese attack. Hq SHC issued directives to the Maritime Group of Forces and the Far Eastern Front which specified the following missions: acting in coordination with the Pacific Fleet, by defense of their occupied positions, they were to support the assembly and concentration of troops arriving in the Maritime and Amur areas, as well as ensuring uninterrupted operations on the Trans-Siberian Main Line. Like missions were assigned to the Trans-Baikal Front. Special attention was focused on readving troop assembly and deployment areas and on organization of defense capable of repelling a possible enemy attack.

In the Maritime sector the command of the Maritime Group of Forces, beginning in May 1945, conducted a number of activities to improve defense along the border, which was extended to a depth of up to 70 km. On the major axes it consisted of three defensive zones. The main defensive zone on all axes ran directly along the border, while the second ran along the rail line. All villages and towns in a 20-kilometer frontier zone were readied for perimeter defense. The network of antipersonnel and antitank minefields was expanded, and field fortification was intensified. Defense was organized with the idea of mounting powerful counterthrusts at the enemy with a subsequent shift to a counteroffensive.

Guarding of the land border was handled by the troops of the frontier fortified areas, which were maintained in a continuous state of combat readiness. A portion of the troops of the fronts were moved up closer to

the border and took up prior-prepared defensive positions and lines. All armies had prepared plans of combat operations for the contingency of an enemy sneak attack.

Measures were also taken to strengthen coast defense on the Sea of Japan and Tatar Strait. This coastline was defended by coast artillery and naval infantry garrisons operating in coordination with naval forces. The Chuguyevskaya Operational Group was formed to defend the coast from Preobrazheniye Bay to Point Sosunov.

By the beginning of July 1945 defense of the Soviet border and coast in the Soviet Maritime Territory and in other important sectors was in a state of full combat readiness and reliably provided support for assembly and deployment of arriving troops. Thus Hq SHC, the High Command of Far Eastern Forces and the command of the fronts prepared and executed a number of measures aimed at providing support for receiving and deploying arriving troops and offering them reliable protection under conditions of potential hostile combat actions. Toward this objective, plans of defensive operations were drawn up as early as March-April in all armies comprising elements of the Trans-Baikal and Far Eastern fronts and the Maritime Group of Forces. Concentration areas and assembly areas for the offensive were made ready in advance. Considerable attention was focused on precise organization of troop movements. All these measures promoted successful execution of the Manchurian Operation.

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The experience of organizing operational support of troop redeployment prior to initiation of the Manchurian strategic offensive operation is of value for the present day as well. Skillful organization and painstaking execution of camouflage and concealment measures demonstrated that battle groups of fronts and armies can maintain concealment in moving to and deploying on axes of imminent offensive operations, and that a certain element of surprise can be achieved in the conduct of operations both at the outbreak of hostilities and in the course of a war.

Also meriting attention is organization of redeployments of men and equipment. A successful march by troops with the means of transportation available at that time, under the extremely difficult terrain conditions, in the Far East demonstrated that it merits attention within the context of today's equipped army operating under present-day conditions on forested mountainous, forest-swamp and desert-steppe terrain.

Measures pertaining to organizing operational defense of the nation's border and moving formations and combined units up to the border were one of the important measures ensuring prompt concentration and concealed deployment of men and equipment. Successful accomplishment of these tasks was promoted by advance preparation of a defense dispositioned in depth and drafting of plans for troop operations in case of a surprise invasion by the Japanese Army. Concentration areas and assembly areas for the offensive were determined taking into account deployment of armies in wide zones of

advance and at a distance from the border ensuring reaching the border swiftly and simultaneously. A peacetime routine was maintained in the frontier areas. Troop movements were executed under the pretext of field exercises. On the one hand this fooled the enemy regarding the intentions of the Soviet command, while on the other hand it improved the teamwork and coordination of our divisions, brigades and regiments. Movement of troops toward the border was executed taking into account the possible conduct of meeting engagements and encounter battles.

The experience of operational support of redeployment of troops during the period of the Manchurian Operation constitutes an instructive example in organization of operational cover of the border under present-day conditions during deployment of forces, especially during a period of threat of possible aggression.

Under present-day conditions, with the development of new weapons which provide capability to mount surprise attacks to great depth, the volume of operational support is increasing sharply, and greater demands are being made on operational support. Road and technical support services as well as troop fuel supply are acquiring prime importance for achieving a high rate of troop movement. These measures are difficult and cumbersome in scope and volume, but at the same time they are vitally essential.

Under conditions of high-mobility combat operations, troops should be prepared at all times to travel great distances with a constant threat of employment of mass destruction weapons by the aggressor, hostile airstrikes, airborne assaults and reconnaissance-raiding parties, with considerable destruction of roads and road structures. Under these conditions dispersed, concealed and rapid movement of men and equipment constitutes the best means of protecting them against nuclear and conventional attack.

Thus operational support of troop movements is acquiring prime significance today, and the experience gained in organizing such support in the Manchurian strategic offensive operation can be extensively utilized in training commanders, staffs, and troops.

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CSO: 8144/0465

## ARTILLERY EMPLOYMENT IN WORLD WAR II ARMY OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 79 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 16-21

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Post-war Period," by the commander of Rocket and Artillery Troops of the Ground Forces Marshal of Artillery G. Peredel'skiy: "Combat Employment of Artillery in Army Defensive Operations"]

[Text] The principles of combat employment of artillery experienced further development in the course of army defensive operations in the Great Patriotic War.

As a rule artillery of defending forces was not strong enough to provide the requisite density of fire throughout the entire defended area. Therefore maneuver of artillery fire as well as redeployment of artillery units and subunits to the most important axes for the purpose of increasing stability of defense and weakening the force of the enemy's attack were considered to be the main principles of combat employment of artillery in defensive operations.

According to prewar views, the average density of artillery in army defense areas would be a maximum of 20-25 guns and mortars per kilometer of frontage. The first defensive operations, conducted in the summer and fall of 1941, demonstrated that this quantity of artillery was clearly inadequate to repulse the enemy. Therefore maneuver of artillery to the most threatened axes, which most frequently would be executed by weapons of the SHC [Supreme High Command] Reserve, acquired primary importance. Concentration of up to 50% of SHC Reserve artillery in the defense areas of the armies of the Western Sector in the fall of 1941 serves as an example of such a redeployment of artillery in an army's defense.<sup>1</sup>

Defensive operations in the Battle of Kursk are a model of extensive maneuver of artillery for the purpose of massing artillery on the most threatened axes. On the Central Front, for example, 62 artillery regiments took part in a front maneuver from 5 through 10 July 1943, while more than 100 artillery regiments took part in such a maneuver on the Voronezh Front from 5 through 14 July. Some regiments executed a maneuver from 2 to 3 times.



Concentration of artillery on the main axes ensured establishment of higher operational densities. By the beginning of the defensive operation at Moscow it reached 7-11 guns and mortars per kilometer of frontage in the defense areas of the armies of the Western Front operating on the main axis of enemy advance, and 13.4 guns and mortars in the 62d Army of the Stalingrad Front, while density reached 57 guns and mortars in the zones of the 48th, 13th, and 70th armies of the Central Front in the Battle of Kursk. Density in the defended area of the 13th Army reached 91.6 units.<sup>2</sup> Almost all artillery in support was under army subordination.

During the course of the war the numerical strength of artillery in the armies did not remain constant. At Moscow there were an average of approximately 600 guns and mortars per combined-arms army of the Western Front, with a figure of 1,100 in the defense of Stalingrad, while there were as many as 1,700 in army defensive operations at Kursk on the Central Front, and more than 1,400 on the Voronezh Front.<sup>3</sup>

According to artillery field service regulations (BUA, Part II, 1937), infantry support (PP) artillery groups would be formed in rifle divisions for defense, for defending regiments of the forward echelon, and less frequently for support echelons, and long-range (DD) groups (sometimes they would be formed in corps as well), chiefly to engage artillery, hit enemy control facilities and reserves. Artillery groups were not provided in the armies.

But in the course of the defensive battles at Moscow army artillery groups also began to be formed in the armies of the Western Front. Powerful divisional and corps infantry support and long-range groups appeared in the armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts in the defense at Kursk. Subsequently (1944-1945) there were regimental, division, corps and army artillery groups in army defensive operations. These groups became an inseparable element of the tactical order of battle.

The composition of artillery groups in army defensive operations was not constant and depended on quantity of artillery and missions assigned to the formation for a defensive operation.

For example, in September 1942 a DD artillery group was formed in the 62d Army at Stalingrad, consisting of four gun artillery regiments, one howitzer artillery regiment, and four rocket artillery regiments. In the Battle of Kursk the IV Artillery Breakthrough Corps, attached to the 13th Army, was divided into two subgroups for the forward-echelon rifle corps. Gun artillery regiments comprised the DD subgroups of the rifle corps; light, howitzer and mortar regiments formed the infantry support artillery reinforcement groups of the forward-echelon rifle divisions. The 13th Army's artillery grouping was designated to repulse an enemy attack on any threatened axis within the formation's defended area.

An army group was not established (due to a shortage of artillery) in the 57th Army in the Balaton defensive operation in March 1945; there were only two corps groups. There was an army and a corps artillery group in the 26th Army.

The fire plan in the defense, according to prewar views, would be set up with the objective of hitting the enemy in assembly areas, on routes of advance, forward of the main line of resistance, and to the entire depth of defense. Antitank gun and machinegun fire was considered the backbone of the defensive fire plan, supplemented by artillery fire from indirect fire positions. The artillery fire plan in the defense included long-range harassing fire (DON), concentrated fire (SO), rolling (antitank) barrage fire (PZO), standing barrage fire (NZO), and direct fire. It was organized in a differing manner in the various defensive operations of the war. In May 1942 the artillery of the 44th Army of the Crimean Front prepared for concentrated and barrage fire only forward of the main line of resistance and on the flanks, while at Stalingrad in October 1942 division artillery and the army DD artillery group of the 62d Army prepared for SO and NZO both along the front and deep in the defense. In the 13th Army at Kursk the artillery fire plan was set up in close combination with machinegun fire, tank fire and artificial obstacles. Artillery of army combined units prepared for DON, SO, PZO, NZO, and fire from guns positioned in antitank strong points and tank-killing areas. This provided the capability to intensify fire during a period of artillery counter-bombardment to combat enemy artillery, as well as when preparing for and mounting an army counterthrust.

In an operation of the 57th Army of the Third Ukrainian Front in March 1945, in addition to DON, SO, NZO, and PZO, a system of massed artillery fire was planned, providing for maneuver of the fire of corps groups into the defended areas of adjacent combined units. Participation of several artillery groups was planned on particularly important objectives. For example, the 21st Battalion (156 guns and mortars) was enlisted to deliver concentrated fire on the enemy in the Nagyba| area (Hungary).

In the course of the war artillery fire comprised the backbone of antitank defense, which included the following: direct-fire antitank guns; artillery pieces of tank-killing areas and antitank reserves; artillery in indirect fire positions.

The prewar rifle division contained 88 guns capable of engaging hostile tanks with direct fire. This made it possible to establish a density of up to 9 pieces per kilometer of frontage and to repulse an assault by the Germans' forward tank echelon (up to 20 tanks per km).

During the first months of the war our armies were conducting combat operations in wide zones, while seriously short of men and weapons. A lack of accurate data on the enemy and experience in waging war dictated the linear deployment of antitank artillery along the front, with shallow defense and without antitank artillery reserves. The density of antitank artillery in the armies of the Western and Reserve fronts in July-August 1941 ranged from 1 to 6 antitank guns per km of frontage, which did not impede the enemy from penetrating our defense with large forces in narrow sectors of frontage. Soon, on the basis of Hq SHC directives, at the end of July 1941 Soviet Army Artillery Hq drew up "Instructions on Organization of an Artillery Fire Plan

in the Defense."<sup>4</sup> They required opposing massed hostile tank assaults by massing antitank weapons on tank-threatened axes. This predetermined a shift to a system of antitank artillery strong points (PTOP). The instructions specified dispositioning PTOp in depth, the establishment of antitank artillery reserves, and incorporation of artillery in indirect-fire positions and antiaircraft artillery in the antitank defense fire plan.

Such an antitank defense was first established on an operational scale at Moscow and Leningrad. Decisive concentration of antitank artillery on the most important tank-threatened axes made it possible to boost density to 10-12 pieces per km of frontage.<sup>5</sup>

The tactical expediency of establishing PTOp lay in the fact that they split up the attacking enemy tank force, compelling it to seek bypass routes and thus scattering its efforts along a broader front. As a result the power of the enemy's tank attack diminished, and enemy losses increased. And although on the whole this system represented a major step forward, there were substantial shortcomings in its organization: frequently there was a lack of fire coordination among antitank strong points; coordinated action between artillery and infantry would be disrupted in the course of combat; artillery occupying indirect fire positions would not always be decisively engaged against hostile tanks; frequently there would be a lack of mobile antitank reserves.

The summer-fall campaign of 1942 brought new successes in employment of artillery against tanks. Densities increased, as did depth of antitank defense. Antitank artillery reserves, which were becoming transformed into a component element of the tactical order of battle, were coming into rather widespread utilization by the end of the first period of the war. In subsequent periods of the war planning, organization and conduct of antitank defense were becoming increasingly concentrated in the hands of the army command. At the Battle of Kursk, for example, the system of antitank strong points and tank-killing areas in the armies of the Central and Voronezh fronts was set up according to a unified plan of artillery headquarters of the large strategic formations, coordinated with combined-arms defensive layout plans. The artillery headquarters of the armies stepped up reconnaissance efforts for their own requirements. Buildup of antitank artillery in the course of battle was specified. In the defended area of the 13th Army of the Central Front, PTOp were deployed in battalion and sometimes company defensive areas as well. In rifle regiment defended areas they would be unified into tank-killing areas, under the command of the commanding officers of these regiments, with the artillery commanders of these regiments second in command, which ensured closer coordination between infantry and antitank artillery throughout the entire engagement and increased stability of antitank defense. Antitank artillery density in the defended area of the 13th Army was 23.7 pieces per km of front.<sup>6</sup>

The fire plan of antitank strong points would be coordinated with artillery fire in indirect fire positions, which in case of penetration of enemy

tanks would be readied to knock them out with direct fire. Antiaircraft and rocket artillery would be extensively employed in this case.

Antitank defense of the Soviet forces experienced further development in the Balaton defensive operation. Antitank strong points and tank-killing areas were set up on tank-threatened axes. Tank-killing areas were deployed deep in the Soviet defenses and included from a regiment to a brigade of SHC Reserve tank-destroyer or light gun artillery dispositioned in depth to 30-35 km.<sup>7</sup> The density of this artillery in army defended areas ran as much as 37.5 pieces per km of front (26th Army). Antitank defense became vigorous, impenetrable, and deep, encompassing the tactical and a substantial portion of the operational zone.

At the present time, in connection with the high degree of saturation of troops with armored equipment, annihilation of this equipment is acquiring even greater significance. It is essential to utilize in full measure the experience of the Great Patriotic War in elaborating a modern theory of engagement of tanks in the defense.

Artillery was the principal means of counterbombardment. Prewar regulations recommended directing counterbombardment at enemy troops which were assembling or assembled in attack position, at headquarters and communications centers, as well as at ammunition dumps, with the objective of thwarting an imminent enemy attack.<sup>8</sup> Artillery counterbombardment did not exceed 15-20 minutes in duration, and its organization was handled by the corps commander. In the course of the war, however, enemy battle groups were frequently deployed along a wide front and at considerable depth. They could be defeated or weakened only by concentrating a large quantity of artillery (especially SHC Reserve). This could be done only by front and army commanders. They were also assigned during the course of the war organization and conduct of artillery counterbombardment, the scale and effectiveness of which depended entirely on results of reconnaissance, quantity of artillery employed, and ammunition availability. Artillery counterpreparation was practiced in the summer and fall of 1941, when there was a serious shortage of artillery, and especially ammunition. It was conducted by the 16th and 19th armies on the Yartsevo axis, where 312 guns and mortars were concentrated in a 10 km sector of front. An enemy battle group was weakened as a result of counterbombardment.

Positive results were achieved from the conduct of artillery counterbombardment by the 62d Army at Stalingrad against the most powerful enemy force in a narrow sector (2-3 km), with a density of up to 100 guns and mortars per km of frontage.

Artillery counterbombardment achieved an unprecedented scale in the Battle of Kursk. In this battle armies were reinforced by a large quantity of SHC Reserve artillery, which made it possible to establish a counterbombardment front of up to 30-40 km with an average density of 30 guns and mortars. In the 13th Army of the Central Front, for example, counterbombardment was planned in four versions for the army's entire defended



area. The fourth version called for delivering fire at 196 targets. The entire force included 967 guns and mortars and up to 100 rocket artillery combat vehicles (density in excess of 30 guns, mortars and rocket artillery vehicles per km of frontage).<sup>9</sup> As a result of losses inflicted, the enemy was forced to shift initiation of preparatory bombardment to a later time.

Experience indicates that in most cases duration of artillery counterbombardment did not exceed 30 minutes. This was due to the fact that up to 0.5 battle scale of ammunition was allocated for counterbombardment, expenditure of which required 25-30 minutes according to 1942 rates. The greatest results were achieved with simultaneous neutralization of enemy troops and control facilities to the maximum possible depth of enemy dispositions, especially enemy tanks. Artillery range, however, made it possible to accomplish this mission only to the depth of deployment of the forward-echelon troops of the enemy's army corps and the enemy's artillery deployment area.

In the course of defensive operations armies frequently mounted counterthrusts against enemy troops. Artillery of the combined units of the counterstroke force, army artillery group, antitank reserves, as well as artillery of the forward-echelon combined units were enlisted to support counterthrusts. The counterthrusting forces were reinforced by SHC Reserve artillery. In the operations of the first period of the war, artillery densities were light when mounting counterthrusts. Therefore their results were limited. In operations of 1944-1945 artillery densities during counterthrusts reached 40-60 pieces per km of frontage. As a rule a counterthrust would be preceded by scheduled preparatory artillery bombardment lasting 15-30 minutes. Artillery support would usually involve successive fire concentration to a depth of 2-3 km, as well as concentrated fire and fire to neutralize newly-spotted targets. Enemy tanks would usually be engaged in the course of counterthrusts by all artillery, in coordination with aircraft.

Characteristic of artillery activities in the course of army counterthrusts were extensive maneuver to establish appropriate forces, close coordination between artillery and infantry, tanks and aircraft, precision control by artillery headquarters, and comprehensive provision to artillery of everything requisite for combat operations.

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The results of conducted army defensive operations convincingly attest to the fact that when war broke out artillery possessed high-quality equipment, a well-proportioned organizational structure and advanced theory of combat employment of artillery. In the course of the war the most important problems connected with delivering effective fire on the enemy experienced further development. Soviet artillery became enriched with the experience and know-how of organizing extensive maneuver ensuring swift concentration of men, weapons and fire on the principal axes, which made it possible to shift in our favor the relative strengths in artillery weapons.



A well-balanced artillery fire plan was elaborated in army defensive operations, and the forms and methods of coordinated action between artillery and other arms were improved.

Particular success was achieved in the area of combat employment of artillery against tanks. Antitank defense constituted an insuperable obstacle to large enemy tank forces, and artillery played a leading role in this defense. It was assigned an important role in conduct of counter-bombardment and support of counterthrusts by friendly forces.

The experience of combat employment of artillery during the Great Patriotic War merits comprehensive, analytical study and its practical utilization for training and indoctrination of artillery personnel in the glorious combat traditions of the hero artillerymen of 1941-1945.

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CSO: 8144/0465

## PARTISAN AND TROOP COOPERATION IN THE UKRAINE DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 22-26

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Post-war Period," by Col A. Domank: "Partisan Cooperation with Troops in the Rovno-Lutsk Operation"]

[Text] The troops of the right side of the First Ukrainian Front (13th and 60th armies), operating in coordination with partisans, executed the Rovno-Lutsk Operation from 27 January to 11 February 1944 (simultaneously with mounting of the Korsun'-Shevchenkovskiy Operation).

Pursuant to the plan, the troops of the 13th Army (Lt Gen N. P. Pukhov, commanding) attacked from an area southwest of Sarny in a westward direction. Then, turning part of their forces southwestward, they advanced into the flank and rear of an enemy force in the Rovno area. Simultaneously the army's left-flank combined units were also advancing on Rovno from the Goshcha area. The 60th Army (Lt Gen I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, commanding) was mounting a subsidiary attack on its right flank, with the objective of capturing the towns of Ostrog, Slavuta, and Shepetovka.

The operation was conducted under conditions of adverse forest-swamp terrain. The spring season of bad roads was presenting additional difficulties to offensive actions. The enemy (combined units of the 4th Panzer Army) believed that it was impossible to attack with large forces in this sector, and therefore did not have in this area sufficient troops to organize a continuous front. The defense constituted a system of strong points and centers of resistance, which lay astride the main roads.

The front command was counting chiefly on the I and VI Guards Cavalry Corps for the exploitation phase of this offensive operation. They were counting on the element of offensive surprise and employment of an outflanking maneuver.

During preparations for the winter offensive, Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (UShPD) concentrated the greater part of its forces in

the zone of advance of the First Ukrainian Front. A total of 16 combined units and four independent detachments took part in the redeployment carried out in January. UShPD directly maintained coordinated action with the troops of the front.

In January 1944 18 partisan combined units were deployed in Rovenskaya, Volynskaya, and Kamenets-Podol'skaya (Khmel'nitskaya) oblasts, in the zone of the 13th and 60th armies. These combined units contained 135 detachments totaling approximately 30,000 men.

In addition, partisan units of the People's Commissariat of State Security and the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Army were also operating in this area.<sup>1</sup>

On the eve of the operation partisans conducted considerable reconnaissance of the enemy. For example, Kamenets-Podol'skaya Oblast ShPD transmitted to the command of the 13th and 60th armies through UShPD information on the enemy force in Proskurov (Khemel'nitskiy), on headquarters, supply depots and airfields in the Starokonstantinov, Krasilov, and Izyaslav area, and military train movements on the Proskurov-Volochisk line. Partisan movement headquarters in Volynskaya and Rovenskaya oblasts communicated detailed information on the garrison at Lutsk and surrounding towns, and on construction of fortifications northeast of Kovel' and along the Kovel'-Lutsk and Kovel'-Brest highways. Scouts from Maj Gen V. A. Begma's combined unit determined the fire plan at the strong points of Tsuman' and Derazhno as well as the strength of their garrisons. Vigorous reconnaissance of the enemy's defensive installations around Rovno and along the Goryn' River was conducted.<sup>2</sup>

Combined units of the 13th Army, exploiting gaps in the enemy's defenses, established direct communication with the partisans and obtained intelligence from them. The I Guards Cavalry Corps, for example, received the latest figures on the strength of the enemy garrisons in Stolin and surrounding villages, while the LXXVII Rifle Corps (Maj Gen N. I. Ivanov, commanding) received intelligence on fascist strong points in the vicinity of the Manevichi and Chartoriysk railroad stations as well as on the existence of a usable bridge across the Styr' River which was being guarded by partisans.<sup>3</sup>

Carrying out orders issued by UShPD, in January 1944 partisans stepped up activities on rail lines and highways, especially in the vicinity of the major rail centers Rovno, Kovel', and Shepetovka. Raiding parties regularly attacked along the Shepetovka-Novograd-Volynskiy, Shepetovka-Zdolbunov, and Shepetovka-Berdichev rail lines, at different points simultaneously. This made it impossible for the enemy to concentrate security units at the most important locations and compelled him to scatter his forces. In January alone, for example, Rovno partisans committed 31 major acts of sabotage on the Shepetovka-Zdolbunov Line.<sup>4</sup> As a result traffic was disrupted on the Kovel'-Sarny and Kovel'-Rovno lines as well.

Vigorous partisan activities on lines of communication led to heavy enemy losses and immobilized the enemy's forces. The occupation forces detailed approximately two divisions in January 1944 to combat partisan combined units of Kamenets-Podol'skaya Oblast on the Shepetovka-Ternopol' rail line. In addition, the 42d Infantry Regiment of the Hungarian 12th Light Infantry Division was assigned to guard the Shepetovka-Novograd-Volynskiy rail lines and the Shepetovka-Polonnoye section.<sup>5</sup> Prisoners captured by the troops of the 13th Army testified that they had frequently engaged partisans, who had inflicted heavy casualties on them.<sup>6</sup> The same story was told by prisoners of war taken in the zone of the 60th Army.

Typically sabotage parties at this time were causing only minor damage on the rail lines, which caused only brief traffic interruptions. At the same time they prevented the enemy from employing track-wrecking machines to put rail lines out of commission. In areas where the Soviet Army was to be operating, partisans usually, in contrast to preceding years, did not blow up major bridges, water tanks, electric power stations and other installations, but on the contrary endeavored to prevent the enemy from destroying them, since this could have a negative effect on the rate of advance of Soviet troops.

At the beginning of January Maj Gen T. A. Strokach, commanding officer at USHPD, ordered combined unit commanders V. A. Begma, I. F. Fedorov and N. V. Taratuta to advance from attack positions in the Tsumanskiye forest, to mount an attack from the rear, and to capture Rovno jointly with units of the 13th Army. The order also noted that the plan of attack of the 13th and 60th armies incorporated utilization of partisan forces.

On instructions from USHPD and oblast partisan movement headquarters, the commanders of partisan combined units and detachments established contact with the command of combat combined units and units and reached agreement with it on joint actions in the course of the operation. On 18 January, for example, I. F. Fedorov and L. Ye. Kizya, commander and commissar of a partisan combined unit, met in the village of Dolgovolya, Vladimirskiy Rayon, with Lt Gen V. K. Baranov, commander of the I Guards Cavalry Corps, and specified a concrete plan of joint actions.

Executing the order issued by the command, the Partisan Detachment imeni Karmelyuk of V. A. Begma's combined unit captured the rayon seat Vladimirets, where it met scouts of the I Guards Cavalry Corps. On 13 January the Detachment imeni Bogun (I. Koncha, commanding) mounted a surprise attack and captured the rayon seat Rafalovka. The partisans deactivated 50 delayed-action mines planted in buildings by the fascists, and seized large food and feed stores. They held the rayon seat, a railroad station and bridges across the Styr' River until the arrival of units of the I Guards Cavalry Corps.<sup>7</sup>

On 19 January the partisan combined units of V. A. Begma and N. V. Taratuta captured Gorodishche and Sylino, and on 20 January the combined units of V. A. Begma and I. F. Fedorov initiated an attack on Tsuman' and Derazhno -- powerful enemy strong points, diverting to themselves substantial enemy

forces. The Tsuman' garrison totaled approximately 1,000 officers and men and 30 tanks, while the Derazhno garrison totaled approximately 1,500 men. They were unable to capture Tsuman', since the enemy succeeded in substantially reinforcing his garrison and concentrated to the south of this station an infantry division and tanks, two infantry regiments and a panzer regiment in the vicinity of Kolka and Chortoriysk, and an infantry division in the Stepan' area, with the intention of encircling and annihilating the partisans. Following heavy fighting, the partisans broke out of enemy encirclement in the Rafalovka and Vladimirets area.<sup>8</sup>

I. F. Fedorov, commander of the Rovno partisan combined unit, established contact with the commander of the 228th Rifle Regiment and reached agreement with him on joint actions against the enemy garrison in the village of Maydany (15 km southeast of Derazhno). Three partisan detachments and a battalion of the 228th Rifle Regiment took part on 21 January in an engagement to capture this village. Supported by regimental artillery and mortars, the battalion mounted a direct frontal attack on the village. When the garrison became engaged, one of the partisan detachments hit it in the flank. Unable to withstand the coordinated attack by the regular troops and partisans, the enemy abandoned Maydany and proceeded hastily retreating westward. Having permitted the column to stretch out, two other partisan detachments simultaneously attacked the flanks of the retreating fascists. The 3d battalion of the 37th Police Regiment was totally routed in this engagement. The enemy sustained casualties of 68 dead, 110 wounded, plus captured prisoners and equipment.<sup>9</sup>

Partisan detachments from the combined units of A. N. Saburov, P. P. Vershigora, M. I. Naumov, I. Ye. Skubko, S. F. Malikov, I. I. Shitov, A. Z. Odukha and others liberated a number of towns and villages during the period of preparation for the Rovno-Lutsk Operation.

On 27 January the main forces of the 13th and 60th armies shifted to the offensive. With the aid of partisans, the I and VI Guards Cavalry Corps were able to concentrate west of Sarny, undetected by the Germans, and reached the Styr' River on 29 January. From there they mounted attacks into the flank and rear of the enemy force defending in the Lutsk and Rovno areas, in large measure predetermining the success of the operation.

Partisan combined units, engaging the enemy on the eve of and during the operation, diverted a portion of his forces from the front. By means of mass sabotage raids on rail lines and highways, they hindered the fascists from transporting men and ammunition forward to the battle line and from transporting plundered property back to Germany. It was noted in an intelligence summary of the LXXVII Rifle Corps, for example, that on 29 January partisans captured the village and station of Manevichi, where they blew up two enemy military trains -- one carrying tanks and the other carrying troops.<sup>10</sup>

On 31 January Maj Gen V. A. Begma, secretary of the Rovenskaya Oblast Underground Party Committee, met with Lt Gen S. V. Sokolov, commander of the VI Guards Cavalry Corps, determined the date of the attack on Rovno and



coordinated with him the procedure of cooperation between partisan detachments and corps units. The partisans and cavalymen were to mount a joint attack from Derazhno toward Klevan', cutting off the avenue of retreat of the enemy troops, sealing them off and annihilating them, and simultaneously advancing toward Rovno from the west, toward the units of the XXIV Rifle Corps, which were attacking the city from the direction of Goshcha.

In the course of the engagements the partisans successfully worked in coordination both with cavalry and rifle units and combined units. On the eve of entry by Soviet troops into Rovno, members of the underground and partisans mined the railroad station, a German officers' mess, and derailed a military train.

On the morning of 2 February units of the I Guards Cavalry Corps, advancing behind enemy lines, mounted a surprise attack from the northeast and dislodged the enemy from Lutsk. Partisans of the Rovno and Volynya combined units took part together with these regular troops in liberating the city and other towns and villages in Volynskaya Oblast.

Partisan combined units, mounting forays deep behind enemy lines, rendered considerable assistance to the regular troops in the course of this operation. For example, the partisan cavalry combined unit under the command of Maj Gen M. I. Naumov mounted a raid through the western oblasts of the Ukraine at the end of January. Crossing the Styr' River, on 1 February partisans liberated the villages of Ostrozhets, Svishchev, Polyany, and Torgovitsa. Their resolute actions south of Lutsk created a threat of encirclement for the enemy forces and promoted the successful advance of the I Guards Cavalry Corps. During the night of 5 February partisans crossed the Ikva and Styr' River near Radomysl' and on 6 February captured the town of Gorokhov, Volynskaya Oblast.

Partisans also were fighting aggressively in the zone of advance of the 60th Army, although the conditions for them here were much more complex than in the zone of the 13th Army. On the eve of the operation headquarters of the combined unit of A. Z. Odukhа sent several raiding parties and detachments into the southern rayons of Kamenets-Podol'skaya Oblast to harass the enemy's lines of communication. Ten raiding parties totaling 300 men, from the combined unit of S. A. Oleksenko, departed for these same rayons at the end of January-beginning of February. These groups attacked the Zhmerinka-Proskurov-Volochisk main rail line, hindering the enemy's military rail movements.

When the troops of the 60th Army shifted to the offensive, partisan combined units engaged enemy garrisons. During the night of 30 January, for example, a detachment under the command of I. A. Muzalev from the combined unit of A. Z. Odukhа attacked the village of Lyutarka, Izyaslavskiy Rayon, where a fascist company-strength garrison was stationed. The detachment commander designated a group of 120 men under the command of detachment executive officer A. Saprаnov to execute this operation.

The partisans noiselessly surrounded the village. Figuring that the fascists would begin withdrawing in the direction of Izyaslav, they mined the road in advance. At dawn, at an agreed-upon signal, the detachment swiftly attacked from all sides. The enemy, taken completely by surprise, was unable to organize resistance. Many soldiers, attempting to escape in the direction of Izyaslav, were blown up by mines. German casualties included 90 killed.

During the fighting for Shepetovka an immortal deed was performed by a partisan messenger, elderly kolkhoz farmer P. Svintsinskiy. Agreeing to guide a large detachment of Germans, he led them not toward Shepetovka but straight toward advancing Soviet troops. Realizing that they had been drawn into a trap, the fascists killed this patriot and his wife, but they themselves were routed in a swift engagement.

By 11 February, reaching a line Mlinov-Dubno-Obguy (8-10 km south of Shepetovka), the troops of the 13th and 16th armies completed the Rovno-Lutsk Operation. Leaving the forested-swampy area behind them, they took up advantageous positions for subsequent attacks into the flank and rear of the enemy's Army Group South.

One of the features of this operation is the fact that it was conducted in close operational and tactical coordination with partisan units of Rovenskaya, Kamenets-Podol'skaya, and Volynskaya oblasts. The Ukrainian and oblast partisan movement headquarters maintained close communications with the command of the formations and combined units, continuously coordinating with them operations by partisan units in support of regular forces, and provided them with intelligence.

The existence of vast areas controlled by partisans, advance capture and holding of cities, railroad stations, towns and villages, bridges and river crossings, and timely redeployment of partisan units to mount attacks in support of advancing regular forces secured, under conditions of difficult forest-swamp terrain, concealed movement and concentration of large combined units (two cavalry corps) behind enemy lines which, operating in coordination with partisans, mounted a surprise attack on the enemy force. This had a substantial influence on operation results. Partisan actions on the enemy's lines of communication disorganized enemy transport activities, disrupted troop supply and limited troop mobility.

The Soviet command highly praised the combat performance of the partisans in this operation. For example, Lt Gen N. P. Pukhov, commander of the 13th Army, subsequently wrote: "In the Ukrainian Polesye we saw with our own eyes what a potent force the partisans became in the struggle against the occupation forces, what staunchness and valor were possessed by Soviet citizens, who responded to the Communist Party's appeal to hit the enemy not only frontally but from the rear as well."<sup>11</sup>

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Ukrainskaya SSR v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945 gg." [The Ukrainian SSR in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941-1945], Vol 3, translated from Ukrainian, Kiev, Politizdat Ukrainy, 1975, pp 73-74.
2. Party Archives of the Institute of History of the Party, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine (henceforth designated PAIIP pri TsK KPU), Fund 62, List 1, File 74, Sheet 11; Fund 70, List 1, File 110, Sheet 67.
3. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 361, List 6081, File 90, Sheet 32; Fund 77, sk., List 6190, File 1, Sheet 29.
4. PAIIP pri TsK KPU, Fund 62, List 1, File 74, Sheet 11.
5. Ibid., File 3, sheets 48-49.
6. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 361, List 6081, File 80, sheets 58, 60.
7. Ibid., Fund 361, List 6081, File 90, Sheet 78.
8. PAIIP pri TsK KPU, Fund 68, List 1, File 1, sheets 111, 112.
9. Ibid., Sheet 145.
10. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 77 sk., List 61906, File 1, Sheet 35.
11. N. P. Pukhov, "Gody ispytaniy" [Years of Trial], Voenizdat, 1959, page 46.

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CSO: 8144/0465

## TROOP CONTROL: POSTWAR DEVELOPMENT FOR COMBINED ARMS COMBAT

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press 23 Oct 79 pp 27-33]

[Article, published under the heading "The Great Patriotic War and the Postwar Period," by Professor and Doctor of Military Sciences Col Gen P. Altukhov: "Development of Views on the Organization of Troop Control in Combined Arms Combat in the Postwar Period"]

[Text] The history of the development of military affairs demonstrates that the state of troop control is of primary significance for maintaining a high degree of troop combat readiness and creation of the requisite conditions for successful accomplishment by troops of their assigned missions in the engagement, battle, and operation. V. I. Lenin stated: "...Every battle contains within itself the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no other means of reducing this possibility than organized preparation for battle."<sup>1</sup> Organization of preparation for and conduct of battle is a most important function of troop control.

During the Great Patriotic War our commanders, staffs and political agencies received excellent training and experience in leading units and combined units under the most complex combat situation conditions. Continuous improvement of structure, forms and methods of troop control at all echelons, taking into account the conditions of conduct of the war, combat experience, changes in the weapons and technical equipment of our troops and those of the enemy constituted one of the decisive factors in the Soviet Union's victorious conclusion of this war.

Experience amassed in the course of the Great Patriotic War formed the basis of shaping postwar views on organization of troop control in combined-arms combat. At the same time they did not remain immutable, since the development prospects of our troops and the armed forces of our potential adversaries were continuously taken into consideration in determining them.

Comprehensive study of these views is of great importance, since it provides a wealth of material for theoretical conclusions and syntheses on this question, introduces elements of practical experience into military scientific research, and promotes correct solution of contemporary problems of troop control.

For examination of the most characteristic features of development of views on organization of troop control in combined-arms combat, it is expedient to divide the entire postwar period into two stages: a first stage up to 1953, that is, up to the time troops were equipped with nuclear weapons in quantities permitting their mass employment; a second period from 1954 through the seventies, when the necessity arose for troop control under conditions of employment of nuclear weapons, a substantial increase in the damage and casualty-producing effects of conventional arms, and extensive employment of radio electronic equipment and computer hardware in all areas of military affairs.

The first stage in the development of views on troop control in combined-arms combat began in 1945. As we know, following World War II the military-industrial complexes of the principal capitalist countries embarked upon an arms race and began intensive preparations for another world war. In this situation the Communist Party and Soviet Government were compelled to take the necessary measures to increase this country's defense might and to strengthen the Armed Forces. Equipping the army with new weapons and combat hardware exerted influence on the scope, character and modes of conduct of combat operations, giving them greater swiftness, which in turn complicated control and imposed higher demands on commanders and staffs. In accordance with basic demands on troop control in the period under review, it was to be grounded on foresight and was to be firm and continuous.

New guideline documents were drawn up and issued taking into account amassed combat experience and future prospects of troop development; then existing views on organization of troop control were reflected in these documents. Such principles as one-man command, centralization of control with granting of broad initiative to subordinates in selection of methods of optimal performance of missions, substantiation and flexibility in decision-making and in working out plans of combat operations, detailed elaboration of problems of organization for combat, especially coordinated action by troops in the field, persistence, firmness and flexibility in executing decisions, and personal responsibility of commanders for their decisions and for the performance of their subordinates experienced further development.

The commander, in controlling his units and subunits, was to display a correct understanding of the assigned task, thoroughly to estimate the situation, to reach a well-substantiated decision and firmly to implement it, to issue brief, simple, and clear orders (instructions), to assign additional missions proceeding from the situation, and to monitor the performance of his staff and execution of assigned tasks.

We know from experience in operational and combat training of units and subunits that troop control consists of measures pertaining to preparation for, organization and conduct of combat operations and specifies the following: maintaining a high state of morale, political awareness, and



continuous combat readiness of units and combined units; prompt allocation of tasks; preparation for and organization of combat actions and continuous coordination in combat; continuous combat, special and political support of the troops; continuous direction of troops in the course of combat operations; continuous monitoring of execution of orders, instructions, and of all troop actions; precision supply activities and organization of combat rear services.

Practical experience has shown that effectiveness of troop control depends in large measure on the system of control facilities, work methods of commanders and staffs, and level of development and utilization of technical devices in control processes. The experience of improving control during the Great Patriotic War attests persuasively to this. During the first months of the war unit and combined unit headquarters were frequently sited at a single location, without division into echelons, were greatly separated from troops and would lose contact with them; these deficiencies had been corrected for the most part by the beginning of 1942. An elaborate system of control facilities began to be employed at the regimental and division echelons of the rifle troops, a system which included command and observation posts (as a command post element), and a support (rear) control (headquarters) echelon. In offensive operations control facilities averaged the following distance from the line of contact: in the rifle regiment -- OP, 0.3-0.8 km; CP, 1-2 km; support echelon, 5-7 km; in the rifle division -- OP, 0.8-1.5 km; CP, 2-4 km; support echelon, 8-12 km.<sup>2</sup>

The system of control facilities elaborated during the war and the procedure of its deployment and operation were formally stated in guideline documents published immediately after the war. The command post (CP) was the principal control facility and was set up at a location from which troop control could be secured, as well as uninterrupted communications with higher headquarters and headquarters of subordinate combined units and units. The CP encompassed an observation post, tactical headquarters, communications center, and service group. The combined unit (unit) commander and staff as well as political agency principal personnel were located at the command post. The principal problems pertaining to collecting and analyzing situation data would be resolved here, decisions would be made and planning of combat operations executed; measures pertaining to organization for combat would be elaborated and direction of subordinate troops exercised in the course of their execution of combat missions; communications would be maintained and coordinated action effected with adjacent units, attached and supporting troops. Reports and information would go out to higher headquarters, to other control entities, and to subordinate troops.

The observation post (OP) was a component part of the command post and was sited at a location from which the commander could personally observe the course of combat on the main axis and control combat. The distance between OP and forward units depended on the terrain and conditions of observation.

The combined unit (unit) commander, depending on the situation, would control his troops in combat from his command or observation post. The commander's departure to his OP did not diminish the importance of the command post, at which work continued on preparing data required for the commander to make decisions and control combat.

Considerable importance was attached to organized displacement of control facilities, which ensured uninterrupted control. Shifting of command and observation posts in the course of an offensive would be scheduled by stages of combat and by time in such a manner that they would not be separated from the units and combined units and the commanders would be able personally to monitor combat. At the same time exercises have shown that too frequent shifting of command and observation posts can lead to instability of operation of communications equipment as well as disruption and sometimes loss of control. As a rule command and observation posts would be moved sequentially, on the basis of preparedness of communications equipment at the new command and observation posts. The move to a new CP would be made only with the permission of higher headquarters. We should note that control facilities at the tactical echelon were still insufficiently mobile. Regular trucks and buses were employed in moving them.

In addition to the principal command and observation posts, alternate CP and OP were to be set up, which were not operating but which constituted locations readied for service, including deployed communications equipment. They would go into operation when personnel shifted to them from the main control facilities. In the defense no less than two alternate command posts would be readied as a rule.

The rear control echelon contained officers in charge of supply and equipping and would be sited at its own control facility, which would be located in the area of deployment of the principal rear services units and subunits.

Such a composition and distribution of tasks among control facilities, as well as their organized location shifting ensured stable and uninterrupted troop control, including during the conduct of high-mobility operations. In order to reduce control facilities personnel casualties from hostile fire and to ensure the survivability of control facilities, these facilities would be sited a certain distance from the battle line, a distance which remained approximately the same as during the war years. Also specified was dispersed siting of equipment and vehicles within the boundaries of each facility, construction of field works to protect equipment, and concealed siting. A command post would be equipped with dugout shelters and slit trenches for shelter from artillery fire and aerial bombardment: pits would be dug for vehicles positioned at a command post. An observation post would be equipped with dugout shelters for working, locations for battlefield observation, and shelters against hostile fire. All this required considerable expenditures of time, due to the low degree of mechanization of field fortification work.

Communications was the principal means ensuring troop control in combat. Therefore establishment of uninterrupted communications with subordinate and coordinating troops and rear services units, as well as air, tank and other warning communications constituted a most important duty of the commander and his staff. Organization of command communications, mutual support communications, rear services communications, and warning communications was specified for control in combat. Radio communications, as the most reliable, wire communications, vehicles, communications by visual and light signals, as well as liaison officers were employed in combined units and units for these purposes. In organizing communications attention was focused on the necessity of considering the possibility of enemy eavesdropping and interception of communications. Communications equipment was being continuously improved during the period under review. New radio relay facilities and radio sets, switchboards, and mobile communications centers were developed for tactical control echelons. Employment of this equipment increased reliability of communications and mobility of control facilities.

Improvement of the work methods of commanders and staffs and utilization of new technical means of control constituted the main directions and areas of meeting the constantly increasing demands on troop control. Toward these ends a large number of staff, command-staff and tactical exercises were conducted. In the process of these exercises recommendations were elaborated on improving troop control, practical employment of which led to positive results, improving control efficiency and quality. For example, conduct of commander's reconnaissance before a commander made his combat decision led in a number of cases to unwarranted delay in decision-making and communication of missions to the troops. As a result of this, subordinate commanders received less time for organization for combat. Subsequently the need for conduct of this measure was appropriately revised. In preparing for combat, missions for combined units and units began to be assigned verbally with a map, prior to issuing a written order, and subsequently would be detailed in the field during organization of coordinated action. The quantity and volume of processed documents decreased somewhat. Technical means of collecting and processing information, preparing and duplicating documents were adopted. Communications equipment, the capabilities of which were increasing year by year, was being increasingly utilized for allocation of tasks.

As a result of improvement of work methods, decisions began to be made more rapidly and communicated to the troops in a shorter time, which increased the time available to commanders and staffs for organization for combat, including time on the terrain. During the Great Patriotic War usually up to 3-5 days would be allocated for organization for combat at the regiment-division echelon, while now this amount of time no longer ensured adequate effectiveness of troop preparation. Capability to organize for combat in a shorter period of time (24 hours or less) was sought out and found, by improving work methods and more extensive utilization of technical means.

Thus up to 1953 the system of troop control at the tactical echelon remained fundamentally the same as at the end of the Great Patriotic War. Evolution of this system took place by improving work methods, perfecting communications equipment, and utilization of very simple technical control means by headquarters staffs.

The second stage in the evolution of views on troop control in the postwar period covers the years 1954-1970. Arming troops with nuclear missile weapons and extensive adoption of radio electronic devices of various function caused a revolution in military affairs. It was necessary to revise the organizational structure of troops and control entities and to elaborate an entire system of measures to ensure protection of personnel, control facilities and equipment from mass destruction weapons.

Under the new conditions a sharp increase in the volume of tasks and missions performed by all control echelons, the considerable reduction in time available for their performance during preparation for and in the course of combat, as well as the degree of securement of stable functioning of the entire system began exerting determining influence on the control system. There was now an even greater need to ensure concealment of preparations for and the element of surprise in attacks on the adversary, effectively utilizing all modern weaponry, retaining the initiative, possessing a high degree of troop mobility, and promptly taking measures to protect them from mass destruction weapons. As a consequence of this there was an immeasurable increase in demand on efficiency, quality, stability, continuity and flexibility of control. It was necessary to revise the composition and structure of control entities, their technical equipment and transport facilities, work forms and methods of commanders and staffs in organizing for combat and dynamic direction of combat.

Exercises and maneuvers, including such war games as "Dnieper," "Dvina," "Caucasus," and others, made it possible to determine the principal paths along which troop control should be improved.

Comprehensive study of the possible conditions of conduct of combat in a nuclear war showed that troops will most frequently be operating not in compact dispositions but on separate, disconnected axes, sometimes considerably separated from one another, with large spacings and gaps in battlefield dispositions. This circumstance began exerting considerable influence on organization and methods of troop control. In particular, a more stable system of control facilities began to be established.

A command post and rear control facilities were organized in units in all types of combat. Combat of subunits was controlled from command-observation posts.

In connection with the constant threat of destruction of control entities by nuclear strikes, it was necessary that they be small in terms of number of personnel, highly mobile and dispersed over a large area. Continuity of control was also improved, since commanders obtained the capability to control their troops from command-staff vehicles while in movement.



Such factors as convenience of troop control, protective properties of the terrain, concealment and camouflage, security and defense capability began to be more fully considered when selecting mobile command post sites. Each post began preparing for immediate assumption of control in case other control entities of the combined units (units) as well as of the next higher or lower echelon became disabled.

Troop control began to be based on combined utilization of various means of communication on each axis (radio, radio relay, wire, mobile, and signal), which made it possible more reliably to ensure their uninterrupted operation. Saturation of troops with a large quantity of radio electronic gear led to the necessity of devoting serious attention to matters of electronic warfare against the enemy's facilities and protection of friendly facilities.

Under conditions of preparation for and conduct of modern combined-arms combat, sharply greater demands were made of commanders and staffs as regards situation evaluation ability, decision-making ability, and the ability to assign missions precisely and to communicate them immediately to the troops.<sup>4</sup> In conformity with this new methods began to be adopted in the practical activities of commanders and staffs, methods which ensured improved efficiency and quality of control, particularly in collection and analysis of situation data, decision-making and communication of missions to the troops. A major role was played by extensive utilization of means of small-scale mechanization and computer hardware.<sup>5</sup> The decision-making procedure was refined, as a consequence of which commander's reconnaissance for the purpose of detailing situation data on the terrain or a decision made from a map began to be performed only when time was available. As a result of these measures, as field exercises indicated, half as much time began to be expended on decision-making by map and decision formulation.

The period under review is characterized by more extensive employment of means of automation in troop control. In order to achieve the required level of control efficiency under present-day conditions, as was demonstrated by the practical experience of staff and command-staff exercises, mere improvement of work methods, improvement in training of personnel or a simple increase in the number of control entities is not enough. The principal way to resolve this problem was found in development and adoption of technical devices. Their utilization made it possible substantially to reduce labor expenditures of control entity personnel and to free time and energy for productive activities.

Thus at the second stage of development of views on troop control in combined-arms combat there occurred a sharp increase in demands on troop control, which led to rapid development of organization, control methods and equipment. Improvement proceeded in the direction of utilization in control processes of both relatively simple technical devices and complex



automated systems. Control entities, their work methods and communications were also evolving and developing.

Practical experience convincingly demonstrates that improvement of troop control is a continuous process dictated by continuous increase in the combat capabilities of units and combined units, the development of new weapons and equipment, and as a consequence of this, by a continuous increase in demands on troop control.

Further improvement of control is connected with the necessity of comprehensive solution of a number of problems of a theoretical, organizational and technical nature.

The need for development and employment of increasingly effective and efficient technical devices is connected with the fact that under present-day conditions it is precisely this area which contains the greatest reserve potential for improving the efficiency and quality of control. The work stations of officers and general officers at control facilities are equipped with technical devices for collecting situation data, information processing, display and transmission, performance of calculations and documentation. Office mechanization equipment substantially facilitates and speeds the work of staff officers. The greatest effect, however, is achieved with comprehensive employment of diversified technical means, and particularly automated control systems. They produce the proper effect if appropriate methods have been elaborated for them.

Improvement of organizational forms of headquarters staff work in troop control is proceeding in the direction of efficient distribution of duties among control entities, their subdivisions and individual officials, determination of substantiated standard time expenditures on principal types of jobs, elucidation of the specific features of the activities of control entities under complex situation conditions and with various actions and influences on the part of the adversary, and determination of the most effective work methods in these conditions. Following are primary tasks in this area: improvement in the substantiation of decisions and optimal character of elaborated plans, maximum utilization of the combat capabilities of men and weapons, and consideration of the actual capabilities of technical means of control.

Control efficiency and quality depend to a considerable degree on the content and quality of elaborated combat documents. Therefore the system of combat documents is evolving in the direction of their standardization, securing of brevity, clarity and precision of presentation, with documents corresponding to the capabilities of technical devices for documentation, duplication, transmission and display, with computer processing capability.

Improvement of methods of training command and staff officers is directed toward developing in them such qualities as a high degree of party-mindedness, professionalism, and the ability to find and apply the most

effective troop control methods under any and all conditions. There also exists the necessity for a certain psychological reorientation of the consciousness of officers and general officers. This is due to the practical adoption of automated control systems, employment of which can present control entity officials with unaccustomed conditions and demand that they acquire new skills. Toward this end there is being conducted periodic retraining of present and training of new cadres capable of working effectively under conditions of constantly increasing demands on troop control.

Improvement of troop control is also continuing at the present time; this is also attested by the experience of local wars of the postwar period. It is important that commanders and staffs utilize all possibilities for increasing the effectiveness and intensiveness of this process.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Works], Vol 6, page 137.
2. N. N. Popel' et al, "Upravleniye voyskami v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyny" [Troop Control During the Great Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1974, pp 55, 56, 58.
3. Footnote omitted.
4. "Dvina," Voenizdat, 1970, page 29.
5. "Ot Minska do Kiyeva" [From Minsk to Kiev], Minsk, 1968, p 228.

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CSO: 8144/0465

## DNEPR ASSAULT CROSSING IN WORLD WAR II DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press 23 Oct 79 pp 41-46

[Article, published under the heading "Skill and Heroism," by Docent and Candidate of Historical Sciences Col (Ret) S. Pechenko: "The Guards Force the Dnepr"]

[Text] The troops of the Steppe Front, having routed the enemy's Poltava force, swept toward the Dnepr, with the objective of crossing it in a wide front, in a hasty river-crossing operation, in the period 24-28 September. The actions of the combined units of the 37th Army (Lt Gen M. N. Sharokhin, commanding) are an instructive example of a hasty river-crossing operation. This army had the mission of crossing the Dnepr in the stretch between Koleberda and Perevolochnaya and seizing an operational bridgehead.

The 92d (Col A. N. Petrushin, commanding) and 62d (Col I. N. Moshlyak, commanding) Guards Rifle divisions were driving toward the Dnepr on the army's main axis, in the attack echelon of the LVII Rifle Corps, while the 110th Guards Rifle Division (Col M. I. Ogorodov, commanding) was advancing in the support echelon.

The 92d Guards Rifle Division reached the river by the morning of 27 September,<sup>1</sup> but due to a lack of organic crossing equipment neither its forward detachment nor the main forces were able to execute a hasty crossing. The three ferries assigned to the division were still en route, and the division commander decided not to initiate the crossing operation with improvised means. Preparations by the combined units to cross the Dnepr began on 25 September, after receiving a warning order. Commanders and staffs studied the river and approaches to it from maps and descriptions, selected suitable crossing sites, planned troop actions, and readied improvised crossing equipment.

On the afternoon of 27 September the division commander, together with his chiefs of arms (services), division headquarters staff officers and regimental commanders, conducted personal reconnaissance, in the course of which crossing areas and crossing sites, staging areas and concealed avenues of approach to the river were detailed. Crossing conditions in

the division's zone were quite difficult: river width ranged from 600 to 800 meters, with the enemy-occupied west bank commanding the Soviet-controlled near bank. A range of hills in the Uspenskoye-Deriyevka area helped the enemy mount a stubborn defense.

In conformity with the assigned mission and considering the availability of crossing equipment, the division commander decided to cross the Dnepr on the morning of 28 September in the area of Moldovan Island and an adjacent island designated by Hill 60.8. The bridgehead was to be seized by the forces of a forward detachment consisting of a truck-mounted rifle battalion, an artillery battalion, two antitank artillery batteries and a combat engineer platoon. The main attack was to be launched in the general direction of Deriyevka. Selection of crossing area and main axis of advance was dictated by the presence of an enemy-unoccupied island, ravines and brush on the east bank of the Dnepr, which made it possible to ready troops undetected for crossing the river (both banks at this spot were suited for organizing assault and ferry crossings). In addition, the capture of Deriyevka, which commanded the surrounding terrain, promoted successful accomplishment of the army's principal mission.

The division was dispositioned in two echelons: the 276th and 282d Guards Rifle regiments in the attack echelon, and the 280th Guards Rifle Regiment in the support echelon. A forward battalion was to be designated in each of the attack-echelon regiments, due to the limited quantity of crossing equipment. All the artillery of the rifle regiments, some of the gun batteries of divisional artillery, as well as some of the batteries of the tank-destroyer artillery regiments were designated to support the river crossing by the forward battalions and attack echelons of the rifle regiments and their efforts to seize a bridgehead. Artillery positions were set up close to the river bank to provide flank and oblique fire capability. In order to gain the element of surprise, the army commander decided to launch the crossing at night, without preliminary bombardment, but with artillery ready for immediate neutralization of the enemy's weapons.

\* \* \*

By the evening of 27 September three tactical rafts reached the division, which made it possible for the combined unit's forward detachment to commence the crossing with these units and on available improvised means, with the coming of darkness, to seize the island with Hill 60.8 and a bridgehead in the vicinity of Deriyevka. But the forward detachment did not commence crossing until dawn on 28 September, that is, 24 hours after our forward subunits had reached the river. During this time the enemy was able to strengthen his defenses on the right bank and set up combat outposts on the island with Hill 60.8. For this reason the first attempt to capture the island was unsuccessful. The fascists damaged two of the rafts with artillery and mortar fire and forced the forward detachment to return to its point of departure. At that same time the 62d Guards Rifle Division, which was operating on the army's left flank, succeeded in executing a hasty crossing of the Dnepr and seizing two footholds on the far bank.

In view of the situation developing on 28 September, the commander of the 37th Army decided to send across the 110th Guards Rifle Division<sup>2</sup> to the bridgehead being held by the 62d Guards Rifle Division and to capture Deriyevka, working in coordination with the 92d Guards Rifle Division.

The 110th Guards Rifle Division, with the 1849th Tank-Destroyer Artillery Regiment, was to cross the Dnepr during the night of 29 September, directing the main attack on Kutsevolovka with its left flank. The 92d Guards Rifle Division, recommencing its crossing during the night of 29 September, had captured Moldovan Island by that evening with a battalion of the 280th Guards Rifle Regiment, while two rifle companies of the 282d Guards Rifle Regiment had dug in on the right bank in the Liman area. The forces of a rifle company had succeeded in capturing the island with Hill 60.8.

The officers and men of the 280th and 282d Guards Rifle regiments displayed ingenuity, boldness and courage in the crossing of the Dnepr. Party member Capt I. A. Zvezdin, for example, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 280th Guards Rifle Regiment, spotted four small boats on the enemy-occupied bank during personal reconnaissance on 28 September. He resolved to capture them and utilize them for ferrying his subunits across. Senior Sergeant Goryachev and his squad volunteered for this mission. As soon as darkness fell the men crossed over to the far bank, skillfully maintaining concealment, took the enemy by surprise, seized the four boats and brought them back to the near bank. Without wasting time the subunits proceeded with the crossing.

Capt N. A. Anikin, a battalion commander in the 197th Guards Artillery Regiment, acted with equal boldness and daring. His battalion provided fire support for the crossing of subunits of the 280th Guards Rifle Regiment in the area of Moldovan Island. N. A. Anikin ordered the guns to be moved right up to the river bank to deliver direct fire, while he and his command group crossed undetected to the enemy-occupied island and proceeded to correct the fire of friendly batteries. As a result of his skilled actions, the enemy's weapons were destroyed and a portion of enemy personnel were killed, while the remaining fascist soldiers fled the island in panic. Then Captain Anikin, crossing to the other side of the island, from which he had a clear view of the disposition of enemy weapons on the right bank of the river, gave the command for the entire battalion to open fire. Under cover of this fire subunits of the 280th Guards Rifle Regiment successfully crossed the Dnepr.

Due to a lack of crossing equipment, the 110th Guards Rifle Division did not begin crossing until 1700 hours on 29 September. By 2000 hours the 307th (Maj P. F. Maleyev, commanding) and 310th (Maj I. A. Onkin, commanding) Guards Rifle regiments, crossing the Dnepr south of Soloshino, reached a line running from the eastern edge of Deriyevka to Lake Liman, relieving here units of the 62d Guards Rifle Division, while the 313th Guards Rifle Regiment (Maj A. P. Izuchenev, commanding) concentrated to the east of Mishurin Rog.





By the morning of 30 September the entire 276th Guards Rifle Regiment, together with regimental and battalion artillery, had crossed over to the bridgehead which had been seized that night. At dawn subunits shifted to the attack with the objective of widening the bridgehead. Encountering German resistance, however, from an area northwest of Deriyevka and repelling seven counterattacks of up to a battalion of infantry with tanks in strength, they advanced only 500 meters.

By the evening of 30 September the 280th Guards Rifle Regiment had concentrated in full strength on Moldovan Island. It was unable, however, to cross the river to Deriyevka. The 282d Guards Rifle Regiment, crossing the Dnepr via the island with Hill 60.8, approached the northeast edge of Deriyevka, where it met strong enemy resistance. The subunits under the command of Sr Lt A. N. Novozhilov and Capt M. A. Serov repulsed four counterattacks and pushed into Deriyevka, where they engaged in street fighting.

Great courage and composure were displayed by 1st Sgt M. P. Panarin, reconnaissance platoon leader of the 106th Independent Reconnaissance Company of the 110th Guards Rifle Division. Returning from reconnoitering the enemy's defenses, he suddenly found himself surrounded by a group of German submachine gunners. Panarin did not lose his composure. He fired point-blank, killing four of them, captured a fifth and brought him back to his company.<sup>4</sup>

Following the seizure of bridgeheads in the Deriyevka area and concentration of the 110th Guards Rifle Division northwest of Mishurin Rog, the 92d Guards Rifle Division and the 110th Guards Rifle Division began advancing on Deriyevka and Kutsevolovka. During the night of 1 October units of the 110th Guards Rifle Division shifted to the attack, and by 1100 hours the 310th Guards Rifle Regiment had captured the southern part of Deriyevka, while two companies of the 307th Guards Rifle Regiment had seized the northwestern part of Kutsevolovka.<sup>5</sup>

On 1 October the 310th and 307th Guards Rifle regiments were engaged in intensive fighting and by evening occupied the southeastern part of Deriyevka and Kutsevolovka.

On 2 October the 110th Guards Rifle Division with the 43d Tank Regiment (30 T-34 tanks), which had completed crossing the river at 1400 hours, was fighting on the previous lines. Effective at 2400 hours on 2 October the 282d Guards Rifle Regiment of the 92d Guards Rifle Division was temporarily subordinated to the commander of the 110th Guards Rifle Division, units of which shifted to the attack on the morning of 4 October. By 1200 hours the 310th Guards Rifle Regiment had captured Hill 179.9, had consolidated its position and, continuing the attack, reached the north slopes of Hill 192.7. The 307th Guards Rifle Regiment captured hills 167.8 and 158.4.

At this same time, by decision of the army commander, the right-flank 89th and 92d Guards Rifle divisions (excluding the 282d Guards Rifle Regiment), having failed to achieve success, were withdrawn from the bridgeheads they had been occupying north of Uspenskoye and northwest of Deriyevka. On 5 October the 92d Guards Rifle Division reached the army's main bridgehead in the Mishurin Rog area, having turned over to units of the 53d Army the small sector it had been occupying in the vicinity of Deriyevka.

The German-fascist command, following repeated attempts to push the men of the 110th Guards Rifle Division back into the Dnepr, redeployed to this axis the 6th Panzer Division, which was fully assembled in the vicinity of Ploskoye, south of Kutsevolovka, by the evening of 4 October, in readiness to counterattack our forces. The situation had become sharply deteriorated in the Deriyevka area.

On the morning of 5 October, following preparatory artillery bombardment and airstrikes, the enemy attacked the left flank of the 110th Guards Rifle Division with the forces of the 6th Panzer Division on an axis running Hill 158.4-Kutsevolovka, while the forces of the 39th Infantry Division and the "Death's Head" SS Panzer Division attacked from Deriyevka in the direction of Kutsevolovka, with the intention to encircle and destroy units of the 110th Guards Rifle Division.

In spite of a considerable superiority and powerful counterattacks by enemy tanks and infantry, supported by artillery and mortar fire, the officers and men of the 110th Guards Rifle Division performed boldly and resolutely. The fighting was particularly savage around hills 179.9 and 192.7, which were of exceptional importance to our forces. A particularly fine job was done by a tank company of the 43d Tank Regiment (Sr Lt S. A. Plyushchenko, company commander) which, jointly with subunits of the 310th Guards Rifle Regiment, captured Hill 179.9. It mounted several attacks on Hill 192.7, which the enemy was stubbornly holding. When Plyushchenko led his tanks into the attack for the sixth time, the enemy established a solid zone of artillery and tank fire. But this did not stop our tankers. They swept onto the hill. At this moment two Tiger tanks suddenly emerged from behind haystacks and rushed at Plyushchenko's tank. The tank commander, skillfully maneuvering, disabled one tank, and the other proceeded to beat a rapid retreat. Plyushchenko thereupon sought to cut off the retreating Tiger. At this time three more enemy tanks pounced upon the command tank. Locked in unequal combat, Plyushchenko ignited one of them with his tank gun, and the others wheeled around to withdraw. Finally the fascists succeeded in disabling Plyushchenko's tank, inflicting a head wound on Plyushchenko. In spite of this injury, however, he kept fighting, withdrawing from the battlefield only on orders from the regiment commander, at which time he was taken to a medical aid station.<sup>6</sup>

By evening on 6 October units of the 110th Guards Rifle Division, engaged in heavy, bloody fighting, were holding hills 179.9, 192.7, 167.8, and

158.4, but they no longer had enough forces to capture Deriyevka and widen the bridgeheads.<sup>7</sup> The division commander, ~~comprehensively~~ <sup>comprehensively</sup> estimating the situation which had developed in the combined unit's zone, reached a decision at 2200 hours at 6 October to shift to the defense, but to establish powerful antitank strong points on the captured hills. This decision was both timely and correct. The enemy refused to accept loss of these important hilltops. Reinforcing his troops, he sought at all costs to push our units back into the Dnepr and to wipe out the bridgeheads.

On the morning of 7 October the Germans shifted to the attack in the sector of the 313th Guards Rifle Regiment, following heavy preliminary bombardment. The enemy mounted the main attack on the regiment's right flank, which was defended by the rifle company of Sr Lt I. S. Okhritskiy. The enemy hit this flank with 17 tanks, four armored cars and two companies of infantry, endeavoring to crush the defense in this sector and to capture Hill 158.4. The steadfastness and tenacity of Okhritskiy's guardsmen, however, thwarted the Germans' plan. The German tanks were met with coordinated, accurate fire by antitank gunners of the regiment's antitank rifle company. Coming under devastating fire delivered by our machinegunners and riflemen, the enemy infantry fell behind the tanks and hit the dirt. During this time the antitank gunners were destroying enemy tanks with accurate antitank rifle fire. Pvt I. Ye. Cherepanov particularly distinguished himself. Fire several rounds, he disabled two tanks and put an armored car into flames.

The enemy sustained heavy casualties and losses in this engagement. Two hundred enemy soldiers were killed or taken prisoner. Four guns, two armored personnel carriers, three light machine guns, 87 rifles and 80 artillery shells were captured.

The men of the 110th Guards Rifle Division and the 282d Guards Rifle Regiment of the 92d Guards Rifle Division fought to the death. They inflicted substantial casualties and losses on the enemy and thwarted all attempts to wipe out the bridgehead, to which the 5th Guards Army was subsequently redeployed. Between 2 and 15 October units of the 110th Guards Rifle Division repulsed more than 100 enemy counterattacks, killed more than 8000 German officers and men, disabled and burned approximately 50 tanks, 14 armored cars, 11 trucks carrying supplies and ammunition, and shot down one Ju-88 aircraft.<sup>8</sup>

Effective 10 October the 110th Guards Rifle Division was transferred over to the 5th Guards Army, as an element of which it shifted to the offensive on 15 October, and during the night of 20 October, together with the 95th Guards Rifle Division of the 5th Guards Army, with the assistance of a tank brigade of the XVIII Tank Corps, captured Deriyevka in a night attack. This considerably improved the situation of our troops on the bridgehead.<sup>9</sup>

The above-described examples are instructive in that they show that even under present-day conditions the slightest delay in crossing cannot be permitted during a hasty river-crossing operation. Even a brief halt only plays into the enemy's hands. If the enemy has been able to establish a defense, all attempts to penetrate that defense will fail without thorough preparation for fire neutralization and a swift attack by superior forces. The main reason for failure to cross by units of the 92d Guards Rifle Division was loss of the element of tactical surprise, although here as well personnel displayed examples of heroism and excellent military skill.

Successful crossing of the Dnepr, seizure and subsequent holding of bridgeheads by combined units of the 37th Army were achieved thanks to thorough and purposeful preparation of the troops to cross the river, especially the forward detachments.

The high degree of aggressiveness of Soviet fighting men and their endeavor to carry out the assigned mission in spite of all difficulties was ensured to a significant degree by effective party-political work by commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations.

In spite of the limited quantity of available crossing equipment and the almost total lack of air cover and antiaircraft artillery protection, as well as inadequate logistical support, the rifle subunits swiftly crossed the Dnepr, seized footholds on the west bank and, even with a small quantity of antitank artillery, succeeded in repulsing counterattacks by large forces of infantry and tanks.

The party and government highly praised the feat accomplished by the fighting men of the 37th Army. For successful crossing of the Dnepr and the courage and heroism displayed during this crossing operation, 213 persons were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union, while 17,500 were awarded medals and decorations. The lofty title of Hero of the Soviet Union was awarded to N. A. Anikin, A. A. Osadchiy, M. A. Serov, M. P. Panarin, S. A. Plyushchenko and many other enlisted men, noncommissioned officers and officers of the 92d and 110th Guards Rifle divisions who had distinguished themselves in these battles.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The 92d Guards Rifle Division contained the 276th, 280th, and 282d Guards Rifle regiments, the 197th Guards Artillery Regiment, the 99th Guards Independent Tank-Destroyer Battalion, and special units.
2. The 110th Guards Rifle Division contained the 307th, 310th and 313th Guards Rifle regiments, the 636th Guards [dabr], 247th Guards Gun Artillery Regiment, 823d Mortar Regiment, 109th Guards Independent Tank-Destroyer Battalion, and special subunits.



3. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 33, List 793756, File 33, Sheet 213; File 45, Sheet 172.
4. Ibid., File 36, Sheet 142.
5. Ibid., Fund 1305, List 1, File 5, Sheet 159.
6. Ibid., Fund 33, List 793756, File 37, Sheet 329.
7. Ibid., Fund 1305, List 1, File 5, Sheet 76.
8. Ibid., Fund 328, List 4865, File 58, Sheet 5.
9. A. S. Zhadov, "Chetyre goda voyny" [Four Years of War], Voenizdat, 1978, page 138.

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CSO: 8144/0465

## FIGHTER CORPS TRAINING IN WORLD WAR II DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 47-50

[Article, published under the heading "Skill and Heroism," by Maj Gen Avn (Ret) F. Kostenko: "Perfecting Flying Skill and Combat Tactics (Based on the Experience of Combat Operations of the 1st Fighter Aviation Corps of the Supreme High Command Reserve in 1942-1943)"]

[Text] The I Fighter Aviation Corps (Maj Gen Avn, Lt Gen Avn effective 17 March 1945, Ye. M. Beletskiy, commanding) completed formation in the first half of October 1942 and subsequently took active part in combat against the enemy.

We should state that military aviation made a large contribution to the offensive success of our front formations. Systematic support of troops on the battlefield, engagement of enemy reserves, disruption of rail operations, annihilation of retreating troops, and gaining of operational air supremacy at Moscow and Stalingrad made it possible to conduct a more successful offensive.

Fighter aviation, for example, acquired experience in providing air cover to ground troops, utilizing two basic modes of combat activity: air patrolling, and alert status on the ground. Air units began receiving new types of fighters, which employed a new combat formation consisting of two-aircraft flights.

Our fighter tactics above the battlefield in performing missions of providing air cover for ground troops, however, were far from perfect at that time, as a consequence of which opposition to enemy bombers was not always effective, and air cover to ground troops was not always reliable.

Unfortunately the I Fighter Aviation Corps of the Supreme High Command [SHC] Reserve was no exception in this regard. It suffered serious setbacks in the very first air engagements on the Kalinin Front. For example, during an enemy air attack on 10 November 1942 on the troops of the 3d Assault Army 12 YaK-1 fighters of the 274th Fighter Division, engaged in combat with fascist fighters, allowed the bombers to get through and bomb our troops unhindered.<sup>1</sup>

The front military council demanded that the corps command organize reliable air cover. It was necessary to take immediate and resolute steps to correct the situation. The corps commander and his staff, endeavoring to get to the causes of the failures, decided first of all to examine the relative strengths. A thorough analysis indicated that the relative strengths in fighters, as in aircraft as a whole, were not in the enemy's favor. Nor were the Soviet aircraft being flown by the units of the I Fighter Aviation Corps inferior to the German fighters in performance characteristics. Then what was the problem? Finally the truth was established -- poor training of personnel both in a special (professional) and tactical respect.

As was indicated by the combat experience amassed to date, in order to accomplish their principal mission, fighters should not be diverted by engaging enemy fighters but should attack bombers, preventing them from bombing friendly ground troops.

One of the elements characterizing the combat capabilities of fighters is an advantageous tactical correlation of forces, which is created during organization for and in the course of air combat. The actions of the corps units demonstrated that many air commanders were well familiar with this most important demand, but for a great many reasons, and unfortunately often by habit or routine, they would fail to take resolute measures to establish an advantageous correlation of forces in combat. Knowing, for example, that as a rule enemy bombers flew in groups of 9-18 aircraft escorted by 6-8 fighters, they continued providing battlefield air cover with small groups of 4-6-8 fighters.<sup>2</sup> Ground alert fighter flights would arrive in the engagement area late, either because the fighter airfields were located a considerable distance back from the battle line or due to a lack of stable communications, and frequently because of a poor degree of readiness. With this state of affairs, our fighters were compelled to engage enemy fighters and were unable effectively to halt enemy bombers.

A second very important tactical element which had a strong influence on success of combat was correct formation in the air. Experience indicated that fighter subunits should be dispersed frontally and stacked vertically. This ensured optimal hostile aircraft search, freedom of maneuver for each individual aircraft and groups, precise coordination and mutual assistance in combat, and employment of the most advantageous modes of attack and repelling of a surprise attack by hostile fighters. And yet the corps continued employing the old prewar dense formations with no vertical stacking.<sup>3</sup> Unit personnel inadequately studied the enemy's tactics, his strong and weak points.

A no less important matter in pilot training was mastery of the new equipment. Experience indicated that only under the condition of excellent knowledge of one's aircraft, proper utilization of its performance characteristics, excellent flying techniques and accurate fire can a

pilot extract every ounce of performance from his aircraft and achieve victory over the adversary. Piloting technique, especially precision formation flying, was weak in the majority of young pilots. They would frequently become separated from their flight leaders and operate alone, which did not produce success. Many were unable to deliver effective fire, opening fire at long range. This led to useless expenditure of ammunition.

Lack of originality in fighter activities had also not been corrected. They would always follow the same route to and from the air cover area, flying at the same altitudes and maintaining the same formations. Patrol zones would be designated above friendly territory.

These were the items which required serious attention.

On 12 November 1942 the corps commander signed an order which contained an analysis and specified the reasons for failures, specified measures to correct them, and gave concrete recommendations.

Beginning in mid-November 1942 young pilots, who comprised 60% of the corps' listed pilot strength, began undergoing intensive training at the front airfields at which corps units were based, in addition to flying missions providing air cover to ground troops and front installations.

Principal attention was focused on flight training, as required by the corps commander's order. Training flight operations were conducted from morning to late in the evening at all airfields. Group precision flying and group air combat were worked on with the young pilots. They were drilled in easily maintaining formation at designated spacings and intervals and remaining close to their flight leader during any and all maneuvers. In addition they were taught to perform the duties of wingman with precision and tactical skill: reliably to provide cover to the flight leader and to provide the latter with freedom of action in combat.

In mock combat maximum attention was focused on vertical maneuver, which had been largely neglected. Commanders endeavored to teach their pilots as quickly as possible to aim at a vertically-maneuvering air target taking into account the position of one's own aircraft, which sharply increased the effectiveness of air combat. Pilots worked on techniques of opening up the formations of two-aircraft and multiple-aircraft flights. Experienced pilots flew demonstration air engagements so that the young pilots could clearly see the advantage of elements of the vertical air engagement and what Yakovlev and Lavochkin aircraft were capable of achieving in skilled hands.

On days when weather did not permit flight training operations with the young pilots, training classes would be held in the dugouts and on the flight lines, at which the pilots would study the performance characteristics of German aircraft and German tactics. Particular attention was focused on study of fighter tactics.

One serious deficiency was the inability of many pilots to deliver effective fire on enemy aircraft. Therefore constant attention was focused on studying the "Pilot's Instruction Guide," which had been prepared under the supervision of the corps commander. It contained nine drawings with a gunsight reticle and tables of lead angles.

We should state that conduct of these important and necessary measures was not to the liking of all pilots. Many of them were unhappy with the fact that they had been taken off the combat mission roster. Some stated that they had become pilots to fight the enemy, not to sit on the ground and "increase my knowledge about him." It was necessary to explain that pilots possessing a poor level of training were not ready to engage a powerful adversary, were risking their own lives and that of their flight leader, and making it more difficult to perform the mission of providing air cover to the front's ground troops.

In addition to training young pilots, work was also done with the experienced pilots who led their subunits into battle. They were refamiliarized with the 1 June 1942 People's Commissariat of Defense order which demanded that the principal efforts of fighters in each engagement be concentrated on shooting down bombers, endeavoring to stop them from further penetration, with escorting fighters to be engaged with minimum forces. The 9 September 1942 People's Commissariat of Defense order explaining the term "combat sortie," stimulated increased aggressiveness and responsibility by the pilots. This order defined a fighter combat sortie as a mission during which the enemy was encountered and engaged.<sup>4</sup> A manual on fighter combat actions, which came out in December 1942, synthesizing the experience of leading units and combined units and the top Soviet fighter pilots, was carefully studied.<sup>5</sup>

In mid-December 1942 the troops of the Kalinin Front began a successful offensive in the direction of Velikiye Luki. Savage fighting took place on the ground and in the air.

Corps pilots prepared particularly thoroughly for each combat mission, endeavoring to cover every detail of the mission. Extensive employment of new tactics was considered the most important thing. Frontally-dispersed and vertically-stacked combat formations were employed. In the air cover area groups would fly at high speed, vertically maneuvering. Utilizing the sun and cloud cover, they would attack enemy bombers with the element of surprise and inflict heavy losses. The young pilots became confident of their ability.

The battle for air supremacy was savage. The end of December and the first half of January was the decisive period in this struggle. During these days the corps inflicted heavy aircraft losses on the enemy in the fighting for Velikiye Luki. On 29 and 30 December the pilots of the 274th Fighter Division alone downed 23 enemy aircraft, and 39 enemy aircraft on 14 and 15 January 1943.<sup>6</sup>



One of the regiments of the 210th Fighter Division achieved considerable success. On 29 December 1942 its pilots downed 21 enemy aircraft. An LA-5 group under the command of regimental commander Lt Col N. P. Ivanov downed 12 enemy aircraft in a single mission, with one of the 12 downed by ramming.<sup>7</sup> We could cite dozens of examples of air battles the success of which became possible as a result of the adopted measures. During all this time the corps pilots mastered vertical maneuver, various tactics for achieving the element of surprise on the first attack pass, maintained constant close coordination in combat with one another, employed frontally-dispersed and vertically-stacked combat formations, and skillfully utilized radio equipment for communications.

Fighting a powerful and well-equipped adversary, the units of the I Fighter Aviation Corps of the SHC Reserve demonstrated excellent flying skill and courage. Combat revealed the indisputable superiority of the new Soviet fighters designed by S. A. Lavochkin and A. S. Yakovlev over the enemy's aircraft. Commanders and staffs of all echelons acquired experience in organizing and supporting combat operations.

In connection with the fact that in subsequent offensive operations as well the principal mission for the I Fighter Aviation Corps of the SHC Reserve was to provide battlefield air cover against hostile air attack, the corps continued improving tactics of engaging the enemy over the battlefield. When preparing for an offensive operation of the Northwestern Front aimed at eliminating the Demyansk bridgehead, the corps commander raised with the air army commander the question of establishing a corps command post in the vicinity of the forward command post of the army which was operating on the main axis of advance. Permission was given.

The very first air engagements on the Northwestern Front confirmed the need for a corps command post located at the front line. The pilots of groups on standing patrol now promptly received information on the ground and air situation as well as weather conditions. And when battle was engaged, frequently experienced officers would direct combat from the ground. All this promoted success.

With resolute actions the pilots of the I Fighter Aviation Corps reliably provided the advancing troops of the front with air cover. For courage in combat with the German-fascist invaders, for valor, discipline and a high degree of organization, and for heroism displayed by personnel, the I Fighter Aviation Corps and its component divisions were renamed with the guards appellation by order of the Supreme Commander dated 18 March 1943. A great many persons were awarded medals and decorations. The five top pilots -- A. Aniskin, M. Gary, A. Kotov, A. Chernobay, and I. Yakubov -- were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

In subsequent fighting, right up to the end of the Great Patriotic War, the pilots of the I Guards fighter aviation corps worked tirelessly to improve their skills and tactics of destroying enemy aircraft over the battlefield.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Central Archives of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Fund 20026, List 1, File 389, Sheet 9.
2. Ibid., Fund 20020, List 1, File 11, Sheet 65.
3. Ibid.
4. VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, No 6, 1973, page 24.
5. Ibid., page 25.
6. Central Archives of the Ministry of Defense, Fund 20026, List 1, File 389, Sheet 18.
7. Ibid., File 11, Sheet 65.

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CSO: 8144 /0465

## PORT-CLEARING OPERATION IN BANGLADESH DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 53-56

[Article, published under the heading "Memoirs," by Vice President of the USSR-Bangladesh Friendship Society and former commander of the Soviet rescue expedition Rear Adm S. Zuyenko: "Feat at Chittagong"]

[Text] More than five years ago a Soviet salvage expedition returned to the homeland, an expedition which at the request of the government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, had worked from 2 April 1972 through 24 June 1974 clearing the port of Chittagong. In 27 months of hard, dangerous work, 26 damaged and sunken vessels totaling 100,000 tons displacement were raised and towed off to the salvage yard, 1,002 square miles of port water area was swept of mines, as were the approaches to Chittagong, and 1,900 tons of iron objects were raised. Our navy people trained 44 Bengalis in emergency rescue and salvage operations. When all operations were completed, the expedition turned over to the republic's government free of charge three diving ships, a large quantity of diving gear, salvage and recovery equipment. The People's Republic of Bangladesh was now able to conduct normal port operations, which is of enormous importance for putting that country's economy on its feet.

The selfless international assistance by the Soviet Union to the young nation was truly of inestimable value. Speaking at a mass meeting on the occasion of the expedition's departure, the republic's minister of transportation, Mansur Ali, stated that at the most critical moment the Soviet Navy people had prevented the republic from starving and had restored to service the port of Chittagong, the "gate of life."

The Soviet salvage expedition consisted chiefly of vessels and ships of the Navy and a few vessels of the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet. The expedition included special subunits of divers and riggers. The first vessel arrived in Chittagong on 2 April 1972. Floating ship PM-40 passed through a narrow channel in the Bay of Bengal cleared through a minefield by Indian minesweepers, headed upstream through the murky waters of the Karnaphuli River, on the banks of which the port is located, and docked at a demolished quay to the excited shouts of a welcoming crowd.

What was the condition of the port of Chittagong when our expedition arrived? Quite frankly, it presented a joyless picture. Solitary vessels stood at anchor in the distant roadstead. They were afraid to enter port: a minefield of approximately 620 square miles had been laid on the port approaches. Along most of the quays masts, stacks and superstructures of sunken and damaged ships jutted out of the water; some lay on their side. We were told at the port administration offices that a total of more than 40 ships had been damaged and sunk, with one ship sunk at the most navigable and narrowest point at a bend in the river. Twelve of 18 quays were shut down. Entry of vessels into port was restricted by displacement and especially by length (not exceeding 90 meters). The port cranes stood silently, and some of them were lying on the quays; demolished warehouses were everywhere to be seen. Only a few ships were willing to take the considerable risk of entering port.

The Soviet Navy men had the job of bringing Chittagong back to life. They would be working under the unaccustomed conditions of a tropical climate. The sun blazed down mercilessly, and humidity reached as high as 100%. Heavy winds blew, and monsoon rains poured down, mixed with hail. Cyclones would suddenly and unexpectedly hit, turning day into night.

On 15 April the first diver descended to the bottom of the river -- PO 2d Class Nikolay Lamukhin. He looked around and could see nothing: before his eyes flowed a yellow-brown layer of water. The strong current was carrying a heavy load of silt. Subsequent dives established that there is a period of 35-45 minutes during which the water stands calm ("stop-water"). This phenomenon is repeated every six hours, when the tide is changing. The tides run up to 5 meters. The "stop-water" permitted divers to work from 2.5 to 3 hours a day. Everything was done by touch; in the dark waters sunken vessels were inspected at a depth of 17-35 meters.

A full-scale effort to clear the port began immediately. In April we began preparing to bring up three large ships representing a total displacement of approximately 50,000 tons. Holes in their hulls were plugged and the water pumped out. They were then refloated and, in a period of three days at the end of April, towed out of port one by one to the scrapyard. As of 27 April three quayside berthing areas, approximately 600 meters in length, were cleared.

Many local citizens came down to the port area during those days in April. The Bengalis watched us admiringly as we worked and offered us thanks. We worked with no concern for the clock; we began work at 0500 hours and knocked off for the day long after midnight.

Sweeping activities began when the minesweepers arrived. The first mine was recovered and detonated by gunfire on 2 May. It was necessary to surmount enormous difficulties in clearing the minefield. Low shores, the absence of landmarks to determine the precise position of ships during sweeping, turbid water, shallow depths, heavy cluttering of the area with sunken motor ships and sailing ships, and numerous sail-powered vessels

moving about the river -- all this slowed progress in mine clearing. The main obstacle was the fact that we did not possess documents on the mine-field.

In spite of all this, however, work continued without interruption. Our task was to widen the channel to three miles as quickly as possible and to ensure safe passage of vessels into the port. The fact is that in connection with the mining of the approaches to the port of Chittagong, the captains of vessels carrying cargo which was of vital importance to the young republic were afraid to enter port, and the insurance companies had sharply increased the insurance rates for cargo ships operating in this area. It was necessary to assist our friends in surmounting this obstacle. In addition, it was necessary to sweep an offshore strip extending from the channel east to the shore to ensure safe passage and exit for sailing vessels and coasters.

Everybody, both friends and foes, understood the political significance of this difficult, highly risky work. But some Western diplomats in Dacca and Chittagong openly expressed doubts that the Soviet Navy could handle the task. Various hints were made to the effect that the Soviet Navy had come to the Bay of Bengal not to raise sunken vessels and clear mines but for an entirely different purpose. The Western press stated right out that the Soviet Union was allegedly planning to establish a naval base in Chittagong, that the work was deliberately progressing slowly, and that the Soviet "armada" contained seven gunboats, which were controlling the entry of merchant vessels into port. Apparently a correspondent for the newspaper LOS ANGELES TIMES, whom nobody was hindering from visiting any part of the port, also looked long and hard for signs of a naval base. He stated the following in the 26 December 1972 issue, in an article entitled "The Mysterious Role of the Russians in Bangladesh": "The fact that the Russians permitted me to inspect everywhere indicates that their real objective is rather the establishment of friendly relations with the Bengalis than the securing of a base for military operations. There are absolutely no indications of preparations for a genuine military presence in Chittagong -- not a single submarine pen, and not a single weapons emplacement.... The Soviet Union has won the affection of the population because it always stood on the side of Bangladesh, from exercise of its right of veto in the UN on behalf of Bangladesh to the swift dispatch of a salvage flotilla to Chittagong."

These words are the truth. The USSR rendered selfless assistance to the young republic. In July 1972 the port of Chittagong began resuming operations; its monthly cargo volume exceeded 500,000 tons, which was greater than the prewar level.

Opening of the "Gate of Life" was a genuine heroic deed accomplished by Soviet navymen. The hopes of many Western experts that the port could begin normal operations in two or three years, when six or seven vessels had been raised and mine-sweeping completed, failed to materialize. Our expedition accomplished the job in slightly more than 3 months. By USSR



Navy Day, 30 July 1972, the channel had been widened to three miles, 50% of all mines had been disposed of, nine damaged and sunken vessels had been removed from the dock areas, and seven stretches of quay had been cleared. A truly prodigious feat.

But a no less important result of our work was friendship with the people of Bangladesh and our colleagues -- seamen and dock workers, a friendship which was growing stronger year by year. At that time the harbor master, Kamal, stated: "Salvage and sweeping operations are being carried out in a very difficult environment encountered here in Chittagong by the Soviet sailors, who have come from their accustomed northern climate to a tropical climate. We are experienced sailors, and yet under these conditions we find it difficult. And nevertheless I am pleasantly surprised at how amicably they are working, from admiral to ordinary seaman. I have traveled a lot and seen a great deal, but I have never seen the likes of this. The Soviet navymen are good friends. We have established excellent relations with them. They are working wonders here. Years have become months. In the opinion of many experts, it would take years to restore the port to normal service. Is this not a miracle? If I were asked what is the most popular country in Chittagong, I would reply: the Soviet Union."

Mine-clearing operations were completed on 25 October 1972, 2 months ahead of schedule; the mine danger on the approaches to the port had been eliminated. Officers V. Korostylev, G. Murzayev, R. Nasyrov, V. Antonov, V. Lebedev, N. Zavadskiy and others did an outstanding job in the mine clearing operations. They are true experts at their job.

On 15 April 1973 we officially celebrated the first anniversary of the expedition. By this time we had raised 13 of 15 vessels and had cleared 10 stretches of quay. The port was now operating at full swing, supplying the young republic with everything it needed to rebuild its economy and supporting the vital activities of the 75 million people of Bangladesh.

In December 1973 we raised the 14,000 ton displacement vessel "Surma." Approximately 300 holes in its hull had been patched and 25,000 tons of silt had been pumped from its interior spaces. With the raising of this ship the expedition completed ahead of schedule the task of clearing the port.

The expedition did not immediately return home, however. At that time preliminary work on port renovation had begun in Chittagong. Many countries offered assistance to the government of Bangladesh. But this job was entrusted exclusively to the Soviet expedition. The government of Bangladesh realized that only the Soviet Navy people were capable of accomplishing this important task on schedule and with good quality. They had already demonstrated that they could handle any job.

Therefore our expedition remained in Chittagong. It had now become easier for us to work. We had amassed considerable experience in employing divers in the Karnaphuli River, and the bulk of our personnel had become acclimatized. In November 1973 the expedition received two 800 ton cranes.

With their assistance we raised and floated two heavy oceangoing barges which, after minor repairs, were returned to service. We completed this job a month ahead of schedule. Crane captain Georgiy Kuz'mich Nikolayev distinguished himself. With the aid of these cranes the steamship "Surma" was cut up into sections weighing 200-400 tons each. The expedition successfully handled this new type of job. All sections were placed on shore. On 1 February 1974 expedition members began training 44 Bengali nationals in rescue and salvage operations. These specialists were to become the nucleus of a newly-established Bangladesh national rescue and salvage service. All work in 1974 was completed ahead of schedule and was of excellent quality. We accomplished a great deal together with our friends.

In 1974 we raised six more vessels from the bottom of the Karnaphuli. Divers V. Velikanov, V. Medyanyy, G. Parfenov, I. Pasechnik, V. Sotnikov and others spent more than 45,000 hours in the swift-flowing, silt-laden water.

After completing the loading of gear and equipment on board specially assigned vessels, on 12 June 1974 the bulk of expedition personnel departed for Vladivostok on the motor ship "Khabarovsk." Thousands of people carrying flowers and flags came to the docks to see the ship off. Warm words of parting, uttered in various languages, wafted from the quay. The remaining expedition members left Bangladesh 12 days later.

Thus our international mission came to an end. Appraising the job accomplished in the port of Chittagong, Soviet newspapers stated that the expedition's deeds had made it heroic, that it had brought fame to the Soviet Navy. This indeed was the case. Soviet navymen, indoctrinated by the Communist Party, had carried out their international duty with honor and had demonstrated to the entire world the lofty moral countenance of the people of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet salvage expedition built in Chittagong not a naval base but rather a "base of friendship." The government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh highly praised the activities of our navymen. Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman stated upon bidding farewell to the Soviet salvage expedition: "I warmly thank all members of the Soviet expedition for the work they have accomplished. If the Soviet navymen had not come to our aid, our young republic would be in extremely difficult straits. I should like to thank all the Soviet navymen for the enormous job which was done to restore the port of Chittagong, in spite of the difficult climatic and living conditions. I am confident that your labor will promote further broadening of the friendship and cooperation between our countries."<sup>1</sup>

Many members of the expedition were awarded medals and decorations for their selfless labor at the port of Chittagong. They include S. N.

Kokotkin, B. M. Stefanovskiy, A. Znotin, I. Semenov, V. Molchanov,  
V. Chastukhin, V. Bondarenko, and others.

FOOTNOTE

1. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 1, 1975, page 60.

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CSO: 8144/155

## STRATEGIC BOMBER TACTICS OF UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND IN WORLD WAR II

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press 23 Oct 79 pp 60-64

[Article, published under the heading "In Foreign Armies," by Major V. Shishov: "Development of Strategic Bomber Tactics of U.S. and England in World War II"]

[Text] During World War II the U.S. and British armed forces conducted a number of strategic air operations. They include, in particular, operations "Point-Blank" (June 1943-April 1944), "Argument" (20-25 February 1944), "Clarion" (22-23 February 1945), and the so-called shuttle bombing operations which involved landing at airfields in the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1941 and throughout 1942 British strategic bombers flew raids on Germany's coastal areas within the framework of Operation "Circus."

The tactics of strategic bombers in these operations evolved primarily in three areas: elaboration of effective modes of mounting attacks; organization of combat against zone and installation air defense -- against enemy fighters, antiaircraft artillery and means of detecting air targets; coordination of operations with other air command and support forces. In practice it is difficult to separate these areas from one another. Therefore it is expedient to present a brief survey of development of tactics on the basis on description and analysis of the most instructive combat episodes.

The tactics employed from May 1940 to March 1942 were characterized by specific-target night raids, chiefly on industrial installations, which were flown by British bombers. It was impossible, however, to destroy all or the majority of Germany's military plants with the aid of equipment available at that time, since these installations were sited over a substantial area (210 square kilometers), and bombing them required an enormous number of aircraft. Subsequently pinpoint bombing was replaced by area bombing, performed by large groups of aircraft. The first such raid was mounted on 28-29 March 1942 on the city of Lübeck. This raid involved the participation of up to 300 Lancaster and Halifax heavy bombers, which dropped approximately 500 tons of bombs.

In 1942 a total of 1,000 air raids were flown into Germany, 17 of which were large scale (involving more than 300 aircraft in each).

Feints as well as conditions ensuring undetected flight: clouds, limited visibility, hours of darkness, and jamming -- were most frequently employed to increase probability of penetration to the designated targets. Auxiliary forces -- subunits of more highly-maneuverable tactical aircraft -- would most frequently be employed for feinting and decoy actions. The attention of air defense forces would be focused on a phony penetration area, which enabled the attack group to hit the target without meeting active resistance by enemy fighters.

In a massed British bomber raid on Köln on 30 March 1942, coast defense aircraft, working in coordination with ground troops, mounted a number of diversionary attacks on German airfields. Subsequently diversionary actions found a solid place in tactics.

A night raid on Berlin on 20 January 1944 was preceded by diversionary maneuvers by subunits of Mosquito aircraft, bombing targets in northwestern Germany. On the following night a group of Lancaster bombers decoyed enemy fighters and "freed" the main attack route. On 21 February 1944, preceding a massed raid on Berlin, an attack was mounted by smaller forces on Frankfurt an der Oder. German fighters, scrambled to intercept the decoy group, were not retargeted in time to defend the capital.

Feint attacks diverted not only air defense fighters but also antiaircraft artillery forces. The German command would rush to shift antiaircraft guns to a bombing target area from other installations, but as soon as the Allies established that air defenses had been strengthened in one area, they would mount raids on other targets with weakened defenses.

The so-called "dual-strike tactic" was also aimed at achieving the element of surprise: several hours following an air attack, a second attack would be mounted on the same target (exploiting the results of air defense neutralization achieved during the first raid). This technique was employed on 25 July 1943 during the bombing of Hamburg. During the day U.S. aircraft flew a raid on the city, followed up that night by a British air raid. The raids continued up to 29 July on such an around-the-clock schedule.

Strategic bomber operations in bad weather and at night significantly diminished the enemy's capability to repulse attacks.

On 27 January 1944 a raid on Berlin was flown under conditions of low overcast. The unexpectedness of this attack resulted in the largest number of casualties inflicted by Allied aviation in bombing raids on Germany. Air defense fighters could not take to the air, and antiaircraft artillery fire was unaimed.



Passive jamming was first employed on the night of 23-24 July 1943 -- bombers dropped chaff with the aim of confusing the air target detection gear employed in Hamburg's air defense system. Specially formed jamming aircraft subunits began operating at the end of 1943. This signalled the beginning of electronic warfare, which subsequently became quite widespread in strategic bomber tactics.

A new kind of tactical employment of strategic bombers was also utilized -- their employment for air support of ground troops. During the Allied invasion of Europe, for example (6 June-17 August 1944), the scheduled landing areas were attacked by more than 1,300 British bombers, which dropped more than 5000 tons of bombs on the adversary's fortified positions. In a single month of the operation Allied aircraft flew 158,000 sorties in support of ground troops, sustaining losses of 1,284 aircraft. According to evaluations of that time, for all practical purposes bombers were performing the role of heavy artillery, coordinating their actions with the ground forces command.

On 16 November 1944 air units of the U.S. 8th Air Force were employed for preliminary air bombardment in advance of the ground offensive in the sector between Aachen and Düren. More than 1,200 heavy four-engine B-17s (together with medium bombers) attacked "tactical" targets, the destruction of which directly determined the course of ground combat operations. For the first time in the history of warfare Halifax aircraft dropped by parachute 75 mm antitank guns and jeeps. Installation of Rotterdam and Moddo radar bomb sights, which provided the capability to bomb targets located close to the battle line without visual contact with them, promoted accomplishment of tactical missions.

Experience indicated that organization of bomber target designation and guidance was an important element which increased the effectiveness of bombing raids. Mosquito aircraft were first used in August 1942, taking off ahead of the main forces, seeking out the targets and marking them with incendiary bombs. Subsequently guidance groups were operating continuously, especially in conditions of reduced visibility.<sup>1</sup>

Methods of coordinated action between strategic bombers and other air force commands were also improving. During Operation "Circus", for example, bombers and fighters, operating jointly, would penetrate coastal areas on the continent during daylight hours, for the purpose of drawing German aircraft into the air. After the enemy aircraft took off, the decoy groups would turn back to friendly territory, while groups of Spitfire fighters, which had taken a favorable position for attack, would engage.

Measures to increase the survivability of strategic bombers were undertaken in connection with appreciable combat air losses. Significant in this regard is a change in the number of downed aircraft during massed air raids on German cities.

A total of 872 bombers were shot down (4.7% of the total) in the Battle of the Ruhr (March-July 1943, 43 raids), while losses were reduced to 2.8% in the Battle of Hamburg (July-November 1943, 33 raids), where the new "Window" jamming system was first employed. In the Battle of Berlin (November 1943-March 1944), however, as a consequence of the fact that the enemy had learned a method of protection against jamming and to impede the ("Goboy") guidance system, the number of downed aircraft exceeded 5%. This figure also indicates the increased night capabilities of German fighters.

Losses of U.S. B-17 bombers, which were operating against German cities chiefly during the day, were even higher. In a final unsuccessful series of raids on Berlin (14 October 1943) they reached a record figure -- 20%. Sixty out of 291 aircraft were shot down, and an additional 138 were damaged. The reason for this debacle was inadequate cover. Thunderbolt fighters could escort bombers only as far as Aachen, after which they were without protection.

It was necessary to stop flying mass raids, which had revealed the vulnerability of the "Flying Fortresses." Bombing of targets protected by strong air defenses was resumed only after the long-range Mustang fighter became operational; these fighters escorted bombers all the way to the target and back.

On 2 June 1944 the first "shuttle" operation was flown, in which B-27 aircraft and their Mustang escort continued on after bombing Berlin and landed at a Soviet airfield in Poltava.

Change in flight profile also applied to techniques of combatting antiaircraft artillery. As a rule bombing raids would be flown at high altitude, beyond the range of small-caliber antiaircraft guns. This substantially reduced bombing accuracy on the target and led to an increase in the quantity of forces assigned to destroy a target.

Toward the end of the war Allied air forces were more and more frequently employing "scorched earth tactics," which were later employed in the U.S. air war in Southeast Asia (1964-1973). In the bombing of Köln on the last 4 days of October 1944, for example, 9,000 tons of bombs were dropped on the remains of this city.

The devastating raids continued and reached a culmination point on 13 February 1945, when Dresden was destroyed. During the night 800 British bombers, attacking in two large waves, dropped 650,000 incendiary and high-explosive bombs on downtown Dresden. On the following day the raids continued, with 1,350 U.S. bombers escorted by 900 fighters. On 15 February an additional 1,100 U.S. bombers resumed the attacks. The bombers attacked not factories and rail lines but the central part of the city, which was reduced to rubble.

The pretext to justify this barbaric act was that it was allegedly important for the Allies to keep the Germans from using Dresden, which was a major rail and highway junction point, for hasty shifting of troops to halt the Russian advance. In order to neutralize these lines of communication, however, it was sufficient continuously to bomb the routes of egress from the city, in other words to hold the city in an air siege, instead of pulverizing it with bombs.<sup>2</sup>

At this point we should also note that bombing of military-industrial targets did not produce the desired results. Fascist Germany was able not only to neutralize the consequences of Allied air raids, without diminishing the pace of production, but even to boost production. This is confirmed by the "Official Report of the German Ministry of Armaments and War Industry for 1944." It notes that in 1944 Germany produced three times as much armored equipment as in 1942, more than three times as many fighter-bombers, and eight times as many night fighters. In addition, as was stated, in 1944 there was observed an increase in the output of certain types of military goods in the last quarter of 1944 in comparison with the first quarter of that year.

The tactical lessons learned from combat employment of strategic bombers in World War II boiled down to the following.

First -- strategic bomber subunits, which did not possess a high degree of mobility or maneuverability, did not have great freedom in selection of tactical devices. Rapid changes in speed, altitude and course, nor attack from the rear could be employed for successful penetration of air defenses.

Second -- hopes for strong individual aircraft protection did not prove justified, as is attested by "Flying Fortress" losses. There was also little benefit from close formations, which provide fire coordination between crews. The need for fighter cover for the bomber's full radius of action remained throughout the war. It is characteristic that after these lessons were learned, long-range escort fighters carrying a larger fuel load appeared in the air forces of the belligerent nations.

Third -- no new tactical innovations leading to decreased losses on certain missions could resolve the problem of ensuring bomber safety as a whole. In time the adversary would figure out the new techniques and come up with effective response countermeasures, after which Allied aircraft losses would climb to the previous level. It was not until air supremacy was achieved, gained thanks to successful Soviet Army operations, in the course of which fascist Germany lost the majority of its aircraft and lost its own domination of the air, that the United States and Britain were able to demonstrate the might of their own air forces, including strategic bombers.

Fourth -- the tactic of massed raids on cities, aimed at undermining the morale of the civilian population and the military, was acknowledged to be faulty. The number of demolished buildings could not compensate in a

military respect for the losses sustained by the Allies' strategic forces in those years. In addition, the tactic of adherence to pattern, to standard attack execution variants had serious consequences for employment of Allied air power. The British, for example, long adhered to the practice of bombing areas rather than selected targets, although they were sustaining heavy losses on these air raids, which for this reason had lost any significance. It was finally a shift to attacking oil refineries and airfields in the overall plan of gaining air supremacy which destroyed the capability of the enemy's air forces to resist.

Fifth -- success is unattainable without prompt and timely upgrading of equipment in conformity with the imperative demands of tactics. New navigation, bombsight and jamming equipment was developed in the course of the war, and weapons, means of guidance and marking targets were improved. B-29 bomber, the "Superfortress," became operational and took part in bombardment of Japan. New equipment and weapons, however, could not of themselves increase combat effectiveness. Also required were corresponding training of flight crews and development of tactics permitting full utilization of the increased capabilities of the equipment. Experience showed that old tactics in a new situation had little effect on reducing losses.

Sixth -- in connection with the fact that strategic bombing had become a most important aspect of air power, the matter of control of strategic bomber forces was acquiring great importance. In spite of the fact that theoretically direction of Anglo-American bomber forces was concentrated in the hands of General Eisenhower, as Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, this by no means hindered the British command from running bombing raids on cities and military targets in Germany, frequently ignoring the interests of the Allies. In addition, this leadership was not always firm and constant. Hence the conclusion that the agencies planning utilization of air forces should have had a detailed plan of operations for strategic bombers.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Istoriya vozdushnoy voyny v yeye proshlom, nastoyashchem i budushchem" [History of Air Warfare in the Past, Present and Future], translated from German, Voenizdat, 1956, pp 188-234.
2. Dzh. Fuller, "Vtoraya mirovaya voyna 1939-1945 gg" [World War II, 1939-1945], Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1956, pp 416-417.

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CSO: 8144 /0445

## CASPIAN FLOTILLA TRAINING AND MATERIEL TESTING DESCRIBED

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 69-71

[Article, published under the heading "Scientific Reports and Information,"  
by N. Belous: "Training of Cadres and Testing of Materiel in the Caspian  
Flotilla"]

[Text] During the Great Patriotic War the Caspian Flotilla, in addition  
to successful performance of its principal strategic mission of protecting  
Caspian shipping, was training cadres for the Navy (1941-1943).

In the third period of the war (1944-1945), when the fascist threat to  
Caspian shipping had been eliminated, training of cadres and testing of  
new equipment and weapons became the principal task of the Caspian Naval  
Flotilla. Flt Adm I. S. Isakov commented that the flotilla had been and  
was continuing to be a naval training center, where "Red navy men, cadets  
and officers of all occupational specialties were trained and drilled,  
personnel who subsequently were moved into the other combat fleets."<sup>1</sup>

Training of cadres in the flotilla proceeded along two lines: the first --  
training of command personnel and specialists in naval schools; the second --  
practical training for naval educational institution cadets and other navy  
school students on board the flotilla's ships and in its units.

The Caspian Higher Naval School (KVVMU) was established in 1939 (sub-  
sequently the name of S. M. Kirov was attached to it). It trained naval  
officers. Cadets studied the history of our party, party political work,  
political economy, and other sociopolitical disciplines. Principal at-  
tention was focused on naval subjects: navigation, artillery, mine-  
torpedo weapons, communications, and others. The graduates of this school  
served not only in the fleets. They also fought on the land fronts, in  
the naval infantry. In October 1941 cadets, upon receiving the rank of  
lieutenant, were sent to naval infantry units which were being formed. The  
second class at KVVMU was also sent to the front. On 1 November young  
lieutenants, headed by the school commandant, Capt 1st Rank K. D.  
Sukhiashvili, were assigned to the newly-formed 75th Naval Rifle Brigade.  
Almost its entire command personnel at the platoon-company-battery echelon



were from the Caspian Flotilla. In January 1942 the brigade was hastily moved to the Kalinin Front, where it successfully routed the fascists. The excellent moral-fighting qualities of the men, their boundless courage and bravery as well as dedication to the homeland and the party were duly noted by the command: the 75th Brigade was soon (18 March 1942) transformed into the 3d Guards Rifle Brigade. The guardsmen proceeded to fight even more successfully. The newspaper of the Kalinin Front contained numerous articles on the feats of the men of K. D. Sukhiashvili's brigade.

The fascists were hit by the former cadets of KVVMU in the fighting at Stalingrad, in the Northern Caucasus, on the Black Sea and on the Baltic. Many of the school's graduates were decorated for courage and bravery, while four of them, G. M. Palamarchuk, K. I. Vorob'yev, S. N. Reshetov, and B. P. Buvin, were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

During the Great Patriotic War the flotilla's Joint School produced helmsmen, electricians and other naval specialists. The skilled teaching faculty -- officers and petty officers -- taught these future sailors with great zeal and affection. The experience of the war was taken into consideration in the curriculum. Helmsmen, for example, studied the following subjects: function and design of rudders, ship maneuverability, organization of navigator service, navigation instruments, navigation, weather service, rules for prevention of ship collisions, rules of formation sailing, signal communications, naval affairs, gunnery, naval combat engineer affairs, and naval regulations. Of course political and drill classes were also conducted. The period of training for a naval specialist 3d class was approximately 6 months. Gun captains trained in independent fire control, while engine room personnel trained to be able to perform skillfully in any situation (in darkness, smoke, fighting fire and water). In the latter half of 1942 alone the Joint School trained 719 Red Navymen of various occupational specialties, and more than 3,000 highly-skilled specialists in the course of the war. In addition, at special temporary courses for command personnel set up by the flotilla, 127 platoon leaders were trained and dispatched to the Black Sea Fleet in the latter half of 1942.

During the war the Joint School received hundreds of letters from its graduates, who wrote from the various fleets and flotillas, thanking their instructors for the naval skills and knowledge they had imparted, recalled their officers and petty officers with a feeling of gratitude, and told of the deeds performed by their former classmates. Many of them were awarded government decorations, while Sr Lt A. S. Markov, commander of an Azov Flotilla patrol boat, was awarded the lofty title Hero of the Soviet Union. While under enemy fire his boat landed amphibious assault troops, killed enemy personnel and destroyed enemy equipment, and repulsed fascist air attacks.

The flotilla provided practical training experience for cadets at naval schools. In 1942 approximately 2,000 cadets received training on board the

flotilla's ships, 2,176 in 1943 (522 of whom were from the Higher Naval School imeni M. V. Frunze, 195 from the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, and 39 from the Naval Medical Academy), 3,387 in 1944 (606 of whom were cadets from the Higher Naval School imeni M. F. Frunze and the Higher Naval Engineering School imeni F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, and 457 from the Joint School of the Caspian Fleet), and 2,320 in 1945.<sup>2</sup>

Future naval officers undergoing practical training on the flotilla's ships were always warmly received and given great care and attention. The men of the flotilla made every effort to assist their young colleagues in reinforcing theory through practical activities, in mastering naval affairs, navigation, fire control, and performance of shipboard service. On cruises cadets studied the combat experience of the fighting fleets and became acquainted with the forms and methods of party political work. Commanding officers of ships and naval units -- the organizers of personnel training -- made every effort to produce skilled officers and petty officers, disciplined and prepared to stand up to any trial for the sake of victory over the enemy.

To provide summer practical training for the cadets and other trainees, 1,605 artillery firing exercises were conducted with sea, shore and air targets just in 1943: 1,075 by the gunboat division (24,246 rounds fired), 234 by the 1st Escort Ship Division (3,382 rounds), 199 by the 3d Patrol Boat Division (2,386 rounds), 52 by the 2d Coast Guard Patrol Boat Division (468 rounds), and 45 by the floating antiaircraft batteries division (412 rounds). The flotilla command specially assigned ships as well as support for conduct of these gunnery exercises.

The degree of completion of practical training programs for cadets and other trainees as well as organization of their tours of duty in units in 1943 received high praise in a 30 January 1944 People's Commissar of the Navy order, which noted excellent direction of the practical training for cadets and others enrolled at navy educational institutions on the part of the flotilla military council.

In 1944 two gunboats were assigned by order of the People's Commissar of the Navy, dated 1 February 1944, for more effective cadet tour of duty in units: the "Krasnyy Azerbaydzhan," additionally fitted out with antiaircraft guns and chemical equipment and adapted for conducting gunnery practice, planting mines and laying down smoke screens, and the "Bakinskiy Rabochiy," on which a torpedo tube and minesweeping equipment had been installed after removing some of the guns.

In addition, this same objective was furthered by combat training, in the process of which principal attention was focused on working on the basic missions performed by the fleets and flotillas during the war years: high-quality operation and servicing of guns and other weaponry, including with skeleton gun crews, organization of all types of defense -- antimine defense, anti-air warfare, defense against motor torpedo boats, etc;

actions to secure ship's hull integrity and survivability of equipment, navigation with limited navigation buoyage, gunnery at sea, air and shore targets, etc. Staff specialists at flotilla headquarters, naval bases and combined units, commanding officers of naval ships, combat units and sub-units did everything they could to improve quality of combat training and to train highly-skilled specialists, capable petty officers and officers.

The operational situation which developed during the war years in the fighting Northern, Red-Banner Baltic, and Black Sea fleets, as well as the fighting flotillas, excluded the possibility of testing new ships and weapons. This possibility did exist on the Caspian Sea. During the war years 277 ships were sent from here to the fleets and flotillas, including 15 submarines and 64 armored launches.<sup>3</sup> This was promoted by a number of measures. For example, in the course of the war various establishments and organizations were transferred to the Caspian.

Testing and fitting out of torpedo boats, large and small subchasers was performed in Baku, at other bases and ports. As a rule, upon arriving in the Caspian, they would be placed, by order of the flotilla commander, under the base's harbor defense (OVR) commander and authorized for all rations, pay and allowances. Usually the builders would provide working drawings for fitting out the ships, which would subsequently be approved by the flotilla commander. Fitting out would be supervised by staff specialists from flotilla and main base OVR headquarters. As a rule timetables would be maintained. After ships were turned over to the Navy special combat training schedules would be drawn up, which would include such categories as single-ship and group sailing, day and night, approach to docks and unequipped shore, gunnery and torpedo practice. This enabled ships to proceed immediately with performance of combat missions upon arrival to their destination point in the fighting fleets and flotillas.

Testing of new equipment and weapons was performed simultaneously with execution of the combat training schedule. In 1942-1943, for example, the following were tested in the flotilla: a patrol torpedo boat, AMD-500, AMD-1000, YaM and other mines, submarine smoke-generating equipment (DA PL), plus test firing at targets in level flight and at diving targets with anti-aircraft guns, and other tests.

In conclusion we shall note that the flotilla successfully performed the job of training cadres and testing new equipment. This was fostered by skilled leadership and direction on the part of the military council, commanders of combined units, units and ships, the skill and industry of personnel and their dedication to the homeland and party, excellent moral-political and fighting qualities, and the endeavor to make the greatest possible contribution to the cause of defeating fascist Germany and its satellites.

On 27 April 1945 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet awarded the Order of the Red Banner to the Caspian Flotilla for its fighting services to the Soviet homeland in the struggle against the interventionists and

White Guardists in the civil war and the German-fascist invaders in the Great Patriotic War, and in connection with its 25th anniversary.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Flt Adm I. A. Isakov, "Voyenno-Morskoy Flot v Otechestvennoy voyne" [The Navy in the Patriotic War], Voenizdat, 1945, page 87.
2. MORSKOY SBORNIK, No 6, 1976, page 23.
3. Ibid.

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CSO: 8144/0465

## REVIEW OF BOOKS ON STAFFS AND STAFF OFFICERS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 81-84

[Article by Lt Gen (Ret) M. Golovnin: "Memoir Literature About Staffs and Staff Officers"]

[Text] Many fine things have been said in military memoir literature about the job done by headquarters staffs of fronts, armies and combined units during the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The experience of wars confirms that victory or defeat in the engagement and operation depends not only on relative strengths, quantity and quality of weapons and troop morale, but also on the quality of troop control.

One of the reasons for the setbacks of some combined units and formations during the first months of the war was unsatisfactory troop control. I. Kh. Bagramyan, L. M. Sandalov and others note in their memoirs that some staffs began the war insufficiently trained and prepared, understaffed and short on communications equipment. In addition, commanders and staffs lacked requisite experience, which frequently led to loss of control.

The organizing and guiding role of staffs in preparing for and conduct of troop combat operations was particularly forcefully manifested during the last war. This is stated in many memoirs.

Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy writes, for example: "...World War II imposed unprecedentedly high demands on staffs, especially at the highest echelon.... The importance of the General Staff in elaborating plans of campaigns and operations increased immeasurably.... The volume of its organizational work also increased enormously. I shall not be in error if I state that in no past war were such high demands imposed on general staffs as in the last war. World War II was also a war of staffs to a certain extent."<sup>1</sup>

Commanding generals of fronts and armies as well as combined unit commanders skillfully relied on their staffs during the war years in matters of troop control, never taking over and assuming their functions. Examples of this include famed military commander K. Rokossovskiy, A. S. Konev, L. A. Govorov, F. I. Tolbukhin, and I. B. Chernyakhovskiy.



The most important condition for successful work performance by a headquarters staff is that it be manned by trained personnel capable of solving complex troop control problems. It is appropriate at this point to recall the statement by F. Engels that "poor officer qualifications affect nothing as adversely as staff service."<sup>2</sup>

Mar SU M. N. Tukhachevskiy spoke of the importance of a high level of theoretical and practical training for staff personnel: "...Merely a natural ability for control service is insufficient; also essential are a high degree of proficiency and regular field drill. Natural abilities should be noted, distinguished and further developed by means of an entire system of staff training in field conditions."<sup>3</sup>

The experience of the Great Patriotic War confirmed the vital force of these demands. But a staff does not function isolated, but rather in contact with other staffs, and can operate successfully under the condition of complete mutual understanding between staff and personnel, higher, subordinate and cooperating staffs.

The memoirs of N. I. Krylov, S. S. Biryuzov, I. Kh. Bagramyan, P. I. Batov, L. M. Sandalov and other military commanders attest to the fact that coordination and training of wartime staffs were conducted chiefly in the course of practical work, as well as at staff drills, staff and command-staff exercises, during preparation for engagements and operations. Of great importance was a healthy moral-psychological environment, creating favorable conditions for staff personnel to work productively and with initiative. Such an environment was established wherever there was mutual confidence and respect, a sensitive and tactful attitude on the part of senior commanders toward subordinates, strict and consistent demandingness on them, objective evaluation of their professional qualities, while a high degree of efficiency, mutual assistance and interchangeability were distinctive features of staff officers. Intelligent instructions issued in a calm tone of voice, especially during difficult and intense periods of an engagement, operation or exercise inspire subordinates to achieve better-quality performance of assigned tasks.

Many of our front and army commanders and chiefs of staff, the tact and demandingness of whom are worthy of emulation, served as an example of such an attitude toward subordinates. Mar SU S. S. Biryuzov, recalling his front commander, noted: "Fedor Ivanovich Tolbukhin... gave the impression of being a very fine man.... I do not recall a single instance where he lost his temper. And this is not surprising, because Fedor Ivanovich was frank in expressing his dislike of excessively hot-tempered individuals...."<sup>4</sup>

Army Gen S. M. Shtemenko had warm words to say about Mar SU B. M. Shaposhnikov: "Boris Mikhaylovich was a charming individual and displayed genuinely paternal warmth toward young colonels such as I was at the time. If something got fouled up he would not swear, would not even raise his voice, but merely inquire reproachfully: 'What seems to be the problem, lad?'

"Such a question made us feel two inches tall; we never forgot our mistakes, and never repeated them."<sup>5</sup>

The view expressed by Mar SU A. M. Vasilevskiy about tactless superiors is interesting: "...Some people would equate a military commander's firmness of character with rudeness. One sometimes did encounter rudeness on the part of certain military commanders, but in my opinion these two terms should not be confused. I do not consider rudeness to be a character trait of a military commander, let alone an element of leadership of troops.... The ability to conduct oneself with dignity in dealing with subordinates is an indispensable quality of the Soviet military commander."<sup>6</sup>

One frequently notes in military memoirs such outstanding qualities of many commanders and chiefs of staffs as an ability to listen to subordinates with patience and attentiveness, regardless of the position they occupy, to find and appreciate useful ideas in their reports and suggestions and, if they are not appropriate, to reject them intelligently, tactfully and with substantiation, in such a manner that they are not insulted, intimidated, with no more desire to make suggestions in the future, but on the contrary, in such a manner that there is engendered the need to think and boldly express their thoughts to their superior.

P. M. Shaposhnikov put it quite well as regards development of initiative in staff officers: "...Initiative in the work of subordinate officials should not only be welcomed by the chief of staff but even demanded by him. In this case it is necessary to display skill and tact, in order on the one hand to make initiative in one's work a continuous phenomenon, and on the other — by sharp and abrupt rejection of unfelicitous suggestions by subordinates not to end their aspirations toward productive activity.... In purely professional relationships superiors should observe tactfulness, tolerance toward the opinions and views of others, subordinates should not be harassed in their work, and ...there should be less sarcasm."<sup>8</sup>

The executive officer or chief of staff is the commanding officer's first deputy, and he alone is authorized to give orders on the commander's behalf. He supervises not only his staff but also coordinates the work of the chiefs of arms, special troops, their staffs and chiefs of services, who participate in troop control and support of troop combat activities. His proficiency level, personal qualities and organizer abilities determine success in the work of the staff and field directorate as a whole. In order to carry out his complex duties, the chief of staff should possess a high degree of military and general knowledgeability, the ability to work with others, and should possess good knowledge of all the finer points of staff service.

Possessing considerable authority, the chief of staff must utilize that authority intelligently, avoiding taking the place of the commanding officer and making every effort to strengthen his authority. The first chief of staff of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, P. P. Lebedev, who held this position in 1921-1924, stated that the ability "to combine his

own volition with that of the commander and to stay tactfully out of the limelight..."<sup>9</sup> is required of the chief of staff. Without this there cannot be smooth, harmonious, productive work by commander and chief of staff, nor full mutual understanding.

Much has been written in memoir literature on that complex, difficult and considerable work pertaining to securement of troop control performed by staff and directorate officers -- operators, intelligence officers, liaison officers, artillery officers, tank officers, engineers, etc. These modest war workers made an enormous contribution to our victory.

Mar SU B. M. Shaposhnikov, who was so well acquainted with staff service, wrote: "Hard work is the road of the staff officer, and every individual who takes this road should be aware of this fact."<sup>10</sup>

A leading role in staff activities was always performed by the operations directorate (section). Concentrated here was all information on the status at the front, on the status of the troops and performance of their assigned missions. Here calculations and suggestions were prepared prior to decision-making, engagement or operation planning was performed, decisions were formulated, operation instructions and orders were drafted, and performance of missions assigned to the troops was monitored.

"Mobility and continuity of troop control," states Lt Gen A. K. Blazhey, "were also directly dependent on smooth coordination and precision in the performance of the operations section, on the level of proficiency and ability of the officers of this section to perform their difficult duties in an exemplary manner. While it is generally assumed that headquarters is the army's brain, the operations section can with full justification be called its central, continuously-operating organism, with the aid of which the command exercised coordination and control of the entire life and combat activities of the army, its combined units and units."<sup>11</sup>

The work experience and deeds of the officer-operators of formations, combined units and units must be used to train and indoctrinate the present generation of officers, the role of whom is increasing to an even greater extent under present-day conditions.

Enormous importance in war was attached to intelligence, with which staff intelligence officers dealt. To be ignorant of the enemy is tantamount to operating blindfolded. The command and headquarters staffs constantly needed fresh information on the manpower and weapons, objectives and plans of the adversary. High praise is given to the activities of intelligence and intelligence officers in the memoirs of G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, S. S. Biryuzov, N. I. Krylov, M. Ye. Katukov, and others.

Mar SU G. K. Zhukov, writing about the 1943 summer campaign, stated: "Observing the performance of the headquarters staffs of units, fronts and the General Staff, I should state that their tireless activities played a most important role in the summer battles. Staff workers labored day and night, painstakingly collecting and analyzing information on the enemy's troops,

on their capabilities and intentions. Synthesized data would be reported to the command for reaching well-substantiated decisions."<sup>12</sup>

The memoirs of K. K. Rokossovskiy, S. M. Shtemenko, I. T. Peresypkin, S. S. Biryuzov and others note the exceptional industry, initiative and innovativeness of the headquarters communications section officers, who provided the command and staffs with communications under the most difficult situation conditions. They always found a solution thanks to their persistence, initiative and irreproachable knowledgeability.

"And communications? What combat veteran does not know," wrote Mar SU S. S. Biryuzov, "the true nature of this sophisticated, capricious and at the same time important means, which is absolutely indispensable in combat? It is not surprising that communications links were called the nerves of the front. The front headquarters staff had to display maximum concern to ensure that these 'nerves' did not let them down, not only during the conceived operation but also in the course of preparations for it."<sup>13</sup>

The headquarters staffs of the arms were of great importance in troop control in the operations of the Great Patriotic War. Without them it would have been impossible to ensure control and efficient employment of a large quantity of artillery, armored and mechanized troops, combat engineer and other units. This point is made well in the memoirs of G. K. Zhukov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, K. K. Rokossovskiy, I. S. Konev, N. N. Voronov, and many other prominent military commanders.

An important role in developing control agencies into smoothly-performing mechanisms, in improving their work methods and mobilizing Communists and all personnel for successful performance of their assigned tasks was played by political agencies, deputy chiefs of sections, directorates and staffs for political affairs, and headquarters party organizations. They thoroughly scrutinized the work of the sections and directorates and demanded of Communists exemplary performance in labor and discipline, and helped correct everything which impeded productive activity in the area of troop control.

Many kind words about political directorate officers of fronts, and political section officers of armies and combined units can be found in the memoirs of N. I. Krylov, M. Ye. Katukov, K. V. Kraynyukov, M. Kh. Kalashnik, K. F. Telegin, N. S. Demin, N. K. Popel', and others.

Memoir literature is a rich, priceless source of experience in the activities of commanders, staffs and political agencies in troop control in the engagement and operation during the Great Patriotic War. This article has discussed only certain aspects of this experience. Study and analysis of the great diversity of work forms and methods of commanders and staffs, which are reflected in the memoirs of war veterans, is not only of cognitive but also practical significance under present-day conditions, when the role of staffs in troop control has greatly increased.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. A. M. Vasilevskiy, "Delo vsey zhizni" [Lifelong Cause], 2d edition, Moscow, Politizdat, 1975, page 533.
2. F. Engel's, "Izbrannyye voyennyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Military Writings], Vol 1, Voenizdat, 1937, page 424.
3. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, "Izbrannyye proizvedeniya" [Selected Writings], Vol II, Voenizdat, 1964, pp 210, 211.
4. S. S. Biryuzov, "Kogda gremeli pushki" [When Cannon Roared], Voenizdat, 1961, page 147.
5. S. M. Shtemenko, "Genral'nyy shtab v gody voyny" [The General Staff in the War Years], Voenizdat, 1968, page 46.
6. Vasilevskiy, op. cit., pp 531, 532.
7. Footnote omitted.
8. B. M. Shaposhnikov, "Vospominaniya. Voenno-nauchnyye trudy" [Reminiscences. Military Scientific Works], Voenizdat, 1974, pp 426, 428.
9. KRASNYYE ZORI, No 7-8, 1923, pp 8-10.
10. Shaposhnikov, op. cit., page 430.
11. A. K. Blazhey, "V armeyskom shtabe" [At Army Headquarters], Voenizdat, 1967, pp 175-176.
12. G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya" [Reminiscences and Reflections], Vol 2, 2d, enlarged edition, Moscow, Izd-vo AN, 1974, pp 160-161.
13. S. S. Biryuzov, "Sovetskiy soldat na Balkanakh" [Soviet Soldier in the Balkans], Voenizdat, 1963, pp 68-69.

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CSO: 8144/0465



#### BOOK REVIEW: PEOPLE'S MILITIA IN DEFENSE OF MOSCOW

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 11, 1979 signed to press  
23 Oct 79 pp 84-85

[Reviewer: Candidate of Historical Sciences Col (Ret) B. Kuznetsov]

[Text] The People's Militia or home guard made a substantial contribution toward the defeat of the German-fascist forces at Moscow. Our nation's capital sent into the regular army 160,000 members of the People's Militia. They acquitted themselves with distinction, taking part in the major operations of the war. Thousands were awarded medals and decorations, militia units and combined units were awarded government decorations, and some were given the guards appellation.

It is gratifying to note that the military deeds of the Moscow militia members are duly publicized in military-historical and memoir literature. Beginning in 1961, the Moskovskiy Rabochiy publishing house has put out six volumes of feature articles and reminiscences about the Moscow People's Militia. Another volume has now been published, completing this cycle, as it were.<sup>1</sup> Of the 239 documents contained in this volume, 206 are being published for the first time. The documents in this volume are grouped in three sections by subject matter. The first section, entitled "On the First Call of the Homeland," encompasses the period from July to October 1941. It discusses the atmosphere of extreme patriotic enthusiasm evoked by fascist Germany's barbaric attack on the Soviet Union. Concrete manifestation of this patriotic spirit included insistent requests to join the militia, requests submitted to various agencies by thousands of Muscovites not subject to mobilization conscription into the army.

Formation of people's militia divisions began in Moscow on 2 July. Within a week the first of these were moved out to training camps for military training.

Interesting information on the history of the formation of these combined units is contained in G. K. Zhukov's "Reminiscences and Reflections." The author states that on 26 June, at Headquarters, Supreme High Command, where the situation in the western sector was being discussed, a decision "immediately to form an additional 2-3 armies with Moscow People's Militia divisions"<sup>2</sup> was made at the suggestion of People's Commissar of Defense S. K. Timoshenko, Chief of the General Staff G. K. Zhukov and his first deputy, N. F. Vatutin, and appropriate orders were issued.

Evidently this day should also be considered the beginning of the organized militia movement in this country. The term "narodnoye opolcheniye" [people's militia, local defense force, or home guard] dates from that time.

The second section, entitled "On the Moscow Axis," contains documents dealing with the process of establishment and organization of militia units, which soon were transformed into a trained reserve for the Soviet Ground Forces. At the beginning of September the 6th People's Militia Division took active part in the fighting at Yel'nya.

The command of the armies and Reserve Front and Headquarters, Supreme High Command closely monitored the thorough training of the militia for combat.

The combat efficiency of the military units and combined units grew rapidly. This was due to the fact that they contained a large worker and party-Komsomol segment, as well as to the high educational level of personnel. Communists and Komsomol members formed the nucleus of the units, comprising 50% and more of total personnel. Up to 60% of militia members possessed secondary and higher education.

This section contains an interesting report by the commander of the 18th Rifle Division (the former 18th Division of People's Militia) to the 16th Army Military Council. The division was engaged in heavy defensive fighting near the village of Gorki. The division commander was requesting assistance. A typical resolution stands on the report: "Comrade Chernyshev! Hold your ground! Do not give up a single inch of Russian soil without exacting blood from the enemy. At this critical moment I shall give all the support at my disposal. Rokossovskiy. 18 November 1941" (page 252).

The division not only withstood the enemy's offensive pressure but on 5 December 1941 shifted to a counteroffensive. Its units penetrated the Germans' defense, crossed the Istra and Ruza rivers, and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy, and capturing 43 tanks, 44 guns, 1,200 trucks and much other military equipment. For the courage, discipline, organization and heroism of personnel displayed in combat, by order of the People's Commissar of Defense dated 5 January 1942 it was redesignated the 11th Guards Rifle Division, the first of the militia divisions to be so designated.

The final section of the book deals with the Soviet counteroffensive at Moscow. It contains documentary evidence of the great effectiveness of the combat activities, the courage and heroism of the militia members.

Fighting northeast of Tula as an element of the I Guards Cavalry Corps, the 173d Rifle Division (the former 21st Division of People's Militia) was one of the first to shift to aggressive offensive actions. By 9 December the towns of Mordves and Venev had been liberated with its participation. In two months of intensive fighting the division captured 57 tanks, 62 guns and mortars and 850 enemy trucks. In March 1943 it was redesignated the

77th Guards Division, and in 1944 received the appellation Chernigovskaya. The division ended the war at Berlin. Its combat deeds were honored by the Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Banner, and the Order of Suvorov, 2d Class.

This volume contains an elaborate scholarly reference system, which greatly facilitates the search for required documents. In structure it is typical for publications of this type. Meriting praise is the detailed article-by-article commentary, which goes beyond the framework of conventional footnotes. Put together on the basis of archival and published sources, it greatly extends the presentation of data on the individual divisions of people's militia and the Moscow militia as a whole.

This first collected volume of documents on the Moscow militia, however, does contain some shortcomings. It would have been more logical not to limit the volume to the time frame extending to the end of the counter-offensive (beginning of January 1942), but to extend coverage up to the end of the Battle of Moscow (April of that year). This would have completely covered the subject. In a number of places there is mention of reforming of combined units of people's militia and assignment of combined-arms unit numbers. But there are no primary documents in the volume confirming this statement. One is distressed by errors contained in the volume: for example, the 130th (former 3d Moscow Communist Rifle Division) is identified on pages 19 and 387 as the 54th Guards Rifle Division, while in December 1942 it was redesignated the 53d Guards Rifle Division.

The noted deficiencies do not diminish the overall good impressions created by this volume. We hope its authors continue preparing for publication archival documents on the people's militia of our country as a whole.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. "Opolcheniye na zashchite Moskvyy" [People's Militia Defending Moscow], Documents and materials on the formation and combat operations of the Moscow People's Militia, July 1941-January 1942, Moscow, Moskovskiy Rabochiy, 1978, 408 pages.
2. G. K. Zhukov, "Vospominaniya i razmyshleniya," Vol 1, 3d edition, Moscow, Izd-vo APN, 1978, page 259.

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